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Few philosophies can rival pragmatism in its influence on American popu-
lar culture. Pundits routinely invoke this down-to-earth creed to label certain
twentieth century intellectual currents, although they disagree on whether prag-
matism bears good tidings. A pragmatic attitude comes in handy, many feel,
when we confront a problem that defies easy solutions and calls for a novel,
experimental approach. Others see pragmatism as a slippery slope that will
lead astray undisciplined minds unwilling to fortify their judgment with firm
principles. Which position one takes depends in part on one's political
leanings.
Few commentators on the right would go as far as Edward Cline in con-
demning pragmatism as "the school of thought which dispenses with the need
for moral values,"1 but it is common for conservative pundits to lament the
baleful impact of this philosophical movement on American legal thought.
Witness Thomas Bowden's derisive comments about "the grandfather of
Supreme Court Pragmatism, Justice Oliver Wendell Holmes," whose distaste
for formal reasoning has reverberated throughout twentieth century jurispru-
dence and is now starkly on display in the Rehnquist Court which succumbed
to "pragmatism, the philosophy that claims there are no absolutes and no prin-
ciples, only subjective opinions guided by expediency."2
Critics on the left are also uneasy about pragmatism, seeing its penchant
for compromise as a sell-out. The so-called "moderate," explains one commen-
tator, is apt to slip "into the managerial technique that constitutes pragmatism
in recent American politics: succumbing to the delusion that he has transcended
ideology, he accepts status quo injustice in the name of hardheaded realism."3
The Clinton administration came into criticism for its excessive pragmatism
from those on the left of the political continuum. "Stephen Breyer was the
candidate who could win praise from Orrin Hatch," Lincoln Caplan noted
wryly, as he berated Bill Clinton for his failure to "display principles," "a need-
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less sacrifice of idealism," and a precipitous slide into the "paralyzing, even
cynical, pragmatism that many have criticized in the Administration [and that]
has shown up unmistakably in its handling of legal issues."4
Political moderates, by contrast, have few qualms about the pragmatic sen-
sibilities which shaped the legal culture of the Clinton era, as evidenced by the
welcome they gave to Breyer's appointment to the Supreme Court. "His legal
culture is more liberal, and his very flexible pragmatism will enable him to give
things a gentle spin in a liberal direction," opined David Margolick, adding
only half in jest that Breyer "is a person without deep roots of any kind. He
won't develop a vision."5 Linda Greenhouse, The New York Times' legal cor-
respondent, concurred:
Stephen G. Breyer is a judge of moderate leanings, a self-described pragmatist inter-
ested more in solutions than in theories .... His avoidance of any single approach to
legal interpretation places judge Breyer squarely within the tradition of legal pragma-
tism that, on the Supreme Court, has included Justices like Oliver Wendell Holmes
and Benjamin N. Cardozo. 6
If news analysts disagree about the pragmatist promise, so do scholars,
who are divided about the meaning of pragmatism and its value for the field of
law. Once they are through compiling a glossary of key concepts, legal schol-
ars dabbling in pragmatism and pragmatist philosophers expounding the law
are quick to caution against expecting much from this creed. "[T]o say that one
is a pragmatist is to say little," admonishes Richard Posner, a prominent figure
in the legal pragmatist camp.7 Richard Rorty concurs, "I agree with Posner that
judges will probably not find pragmatist philosophers - either old or new -
useful."8 "Indeed, if you take the antifoundationalism of pragmatism seri-
ously," Stanley Fish pushes the argument a step further, "you will see that there
is absolutely nothing you can do with it."9
Skepticism about legal pragmatism may carry a sharper edge. Donald
Dworkin, who gave a good deal of credit to legal pragmatism in his Laws'
Empire,1 ° has little use for self-described pragmatists like Posner, whose work
he finds "erudite, punchy, knock-about, witty, and relentlessly superficial.""
Dworkin is equally blunt about Rorty's philosophy, for "what Professor Rorty
calls 'new' pragmatism has nothing to contribute to legal theory, except to pro-
vide yet another way for legal scholars to be busy while actually doing
nothing." 2
A more upbeat brand of legal pragmatism is associated with the German
political philosopher Jflrgen Habermas who developed an elaborate discourse
4 Lincoln Caplan, Lawyers Without a Cause, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 10, 1994, at A19.
5 David Margolick, Scholarly Consensus Builder, N.Y. TIMES, May 14, 1994, at Al.
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LAW AND SOCIETY 89, 92 (Michael Brint & William Weaver eds., 1991).
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and Ronald Dworkin, in PRAGMATISM IN LAW AND SOCIETY, supra note 8, at 47, 63.
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concept of law.' 3 A group of American legal scholars influenced by Habermas
has been pushing his discourse theoretic framework in new directions, applying
it to a broad range of democratic processes.' 4 What is interesting about this
movement is that its proponents seek to transcend the court-centered approach
with its adversarial culture and practice law in a pragmatist key in alternative
dispute resolution forums where pragmatist insights are applied to grass root
democratic processes. A lecture Carrie Menkel-Meadow recently gave at the
Saltman Center for Conflict Resolution at the William S. Boyd School of Law
highlights a wide range of experiments currently underway that promise to give
legal pragmatism a wider resonance.15
This paper is about jurists' encounter with pragmatism and pragmatist phi-
losophers' grappling with law. It reviews the range of discursive and nondis-
cursive practices associated with the pragmatic perspective on law and
democracy. Section II begins with Kant's legal philosophy and its peculiar
relevance for pragmatism as a negative reference frame. Section III shows how
philosophers responded to Kant. Section IV tracks the jurists' reaction to prag-
matism. Section V analyzes recent trends in legal pragmatism. Section VI dis-
cusses the place of principles in pragmatic jurisprudence. Section VII focuses
on attempts to reclaim the Kantian insights in the discourse theory of law and
democracy. And Section VIII joins issues with the process theorists of democ-
racy and appeals to the legacy of John Dewey and George Herbert Mead as
theoreticians of the fully embodied democratic process.
II. KANT'S JURIDICAL MORALISM
Pragmatism and transcendental idealism are commonly seen as antithetical
creeds in philosophy, one committed to a priori principles independent from
experience, the other sacrificing philosophical abstractions to practical wisdom.
Thus, it is all the more intriguing that Charles Peirce, the pioneer of pragmatist
thought, not only spoke highly of Kant but also saw him as something of a
precursor. "Kant (whom I more than admire) is nothing but a somewhat con-
fused pragmatist,"16 intimated Peirce, who did not mean this as a backhanded
compliment.
Kant was probably the first to use "pragmatic" as a philosophical term,
notably in his Critique of Pure Reason, where he juxtaposed "pragmatic laws
... recommended to us by the senses" and "practical laws.., given by reason
13 JORGEN HABERMAS, BETWEEN FACTS AND NORMS: CONTRIBUTION TO A DISCOURSE THE-
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entirely a priori." 17 This opposition recurs in all three of Kant's Critiques, as
well as in his Metaphysical Elements of Justice, Doctrine of Virtue, and his
lesser known Anthropology from a Pragmatic Point of View, which draws a
contrast between pragmatic (pragmatisch) considerations rooted in everyday
experience and practical (praktisch) motives ennobled by theoretical reflection.
Another angle that makes Kant a good starting point for the present
inquiry is the pervasive legalism of his thought. Legal metaphors are among
Kant's favorite. When he is groping for rhetorical tools equal to the task he set
for himself in his path breaking Critique of Pure Reason, he summons legal
imagery to communicate the exalted place critical reason is destined to play in
human affairs. "The critique of pure reason may really be looked upon as the
true tribunal for all disputes of reason... [which] secures to us the peace of a
legal status, in which disputes are not to be carried on except in the proper form
of a lawsuit."' 8 Positive or civil law has a power to coerce conduct, but it does
not have the dignity that the testimony of pure reason lends to our decisions.
Substantive law must perfect itself by hewing closely to the a priori moral
principles dormant in every citizen who, upon transcendental reflection, discov-
ers "that he has a universal legislation within himself' 9 and imposes his
rational will on the world at large.
Kant's strategy here is to intermesh as much as possible law and morality.
He is cognizant of the fact that law can be immoral and moral action illegal, but
he sees the best hope for the future in suffusing legal matters with moral
precepts and imparting formal-logical rigor to moral reasoning. The result is a
kind of "juridical moralism" or "ethical legalism" which endows conscience
with legislative powers and turns every citizen into a lawgiver.
While morality and law are mutually constitutive in a perfectly rational
state - the former asserts the dignity and universal rights of every human being,
the latter backs the dictates of reason with administrative power - the relation-
ship between the two is not symmetrical. Civil courts apply the extant corpus
of laws without passing judgment on their wisdom. Moral practical reason, by
contrast, gives laws their ultimate justification by furnishing an a priori true
foundation for the entire legal edifice. While the tribunal of practical reason
cannot prescribe laws their empirical content, reason enlightened by transcen-
dental reflection is well equipped to formulate its constitutive principles, such
as respect for civil rights, reverence for human dignity, abhorrence of violence,
and control over the legitimate means of coercion. Hence, Kant draws a rather
invidious comparison between "civil court" and the "court of conscience, '"20
the "authorization [that] is wholly external" and "freedom according to univer-
sal laws,"'" and the "mere agreement or disagreement of an action with the law
17 IMMANUEL KANT, CRITIQUE OF PURE REASON 513 (F. Max Muller trans., Anchor Books
1966) (1781).
18 Id. at 486.
19 IMMANUEL KANT, THE METAPHYSICAL ELEMENTS OF JUSTICE: PART I OF THE METAPHYS-
ICS OF MORALS 16 (John Ladd trans., Macmillan Pub. Co. 1965) (1797).
20 Id. at 41.
21 Id. at 36.
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• . . called legality" and conduct motivated by "the Idea of duty . . . [that] is
called the morality of the action."22
Politically, Kant is treading here on ground well traveled by natural law
theorists who sought constitutional limits on political absolutism. He is partic-
ularly indebted to Rousseau, who blended a sovereign and a subject into a citi-
zen called upon to obey no law except the self-legislated one. Such a citizen
will reside in a blessed republic where the general will coincides with the will
of everyone.
Kant, however, parts company with his predecessors on several fronts
when he deals with practical ("pragmatic" in his terms) adjudication and what
we would call today "judicious temperament." People well versed in theoreti-
cal matters may follow general rules, but they are not necessarily good judges
when it comes to particulars, Kant astutely observes - "the faculty of judgment
is a special talent which cannot be taught, but must be practiced."'23 Hence, his
advice to judges is to take special care "in order to guard the faculty of judg-
ment against mistakes (lapsus judicii).''24 Even supple minds should heed this
advice when they step into the pragmatic domain: "A physician, therefore, a
judge, or a politician, may carry in his head many beautiful pathological, juridi-
cal, or political rules, nay, he may even become an accurate teacher of them,
and he may yet in the application of these rules commit many a blunder .... 25
To guard against lapsus judicii one has to cultivate a judicious temper that
eschews negative emotions and cultivates "the habitually cheerful heart,"26 a
"kind of hygiene that man should practice to keep himself morally healthy. 2 7
Kant is adamant about temperamental preconditions for sound judgment. He
calls upon all citizens, professional or otherwise, to exercise a judicious atti-
tude, which requires taming emotions and ruthlessly suppressing passions:
Passions are cancerous stores for pure practical reason, and most of them are incur-
able .... Therefore passions are not, like emotions, merely unfortunate moods teem-
ing with many evils, but they are without exception bad. Even the most well-
intended desire if it aims... at what belongs to virtue, that is, to charity, is neverthe-
less . . . as soon as it changes to passion, not merely pragmatically pernicious, but
also morally reprehensible.
2 8
If passion is the enemy of reason, then freedom is first and foremost free-
dom from passion - indeed, from negative affect in general, for "what we do
cheerlessly and merely as compulsory service has no intrinsic value for us." 29
Even when it comes to positive emotions, reason has to assert its mastery.
Moral practical reason has nothing to learn from affect. However benign this
affect might be, it will not pass the test of practical reason unless it is thor-
22 Id. at 19.
23 See KANT, supra note 17, at 119. "Deficiency in the faculty of judgment is really what
we call stupidity, and there is no remedy for that." Id.
24 Id. at 120.
25 Id. at 119.
26 IMMANUEL KANT, THE DOcTRINE OF VIRTUE: PART II OF THE METAPHYSICS OF MORALS
159 (Mary J. Gregor trans., Harper & Row 1964) (1797).
27 Id.
28 IMMANUEL KANT, ANTHROPOLOGY FROM A PRAGMATIC POINT OF VIEW 174 (Victor Lyle
Dowdle trans., S. I11. Univ. Press 1978) (1798).
29 See KANT, supra note 26, at 158.
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oughly infused with a sense of duty. Helping a friend out of sympathy would
be morally reprehensible on this account, as would be tending for a child with
mere affection as a guide. In a juridically moral state based on the categorical
imperative we all can be "cheerful in the consciousness of our restored free-
dom, ' 30 as every citizen's action attests to "the purity of his moral purpose and
the sincerity of his attitude. 3 1
There is a political dimension to Kant's thought that has appealed even to
those who rejected his philosophical method, a dimension that foregrounds free
inquiry and promotes speech conditions conducive to democracy. At least in
theory, Kant is committed to a deliberative process in which "everybody has a
vote, ' ' 32 which allows "no other judge but universal human reason, '" and
which "grant[s] to reason the fullest freedom, both of enquiry and of criti-
cism."' 34 Closely related to this theme is the strategically important distinction
between an act of "justification" which grounds a policy in moral concerns for
universal rights and an act of "adjudication" which squares off conduct with
existing laws without questioning their raison d'etre (reason). This activist
approach explains the continuous relevance of Kant to the ongoing debates
about deliberative democracy. The pragmatic question that Kant bequeathed to
his successors is whether society can be organized around the discursive princi-
ples grounded in moral concerns, and if so, how we go about instituting such a
society.
Kant is fully aware that history falls short of what pure practical reason
mandates, that "what one himself recognizes on good grounds to be just will
not receive confirmation in a court of justice" and "what he must judge unjust
in itself will be treated with indulgence by the court."' 35 Still, Kant is sanguine
about the pragmatic import of his theory. He stakes his hopes on social
pedagogy, on a broadly conceived educational practice that cultivates respect
for human autonomy, rouses moral imagination, promotes peace in interna-
tional relations through a "league of nations, 36 and pursues similar lofty
causes. The concept of human liberty under universal law might be utopian,
Kant admits at some point, but at the very least it can serve as a worthy ideal.
The problem with Kant's theory is that it does not square very well with
his more specific recommendations. Contemporary readers are bound to wince
when they follow Kant into the pragmatic realm and check his path-breaking
intellections against his legal and political opinions. I am not talking about the
misogynistic witticisms jumping from the pages of Kant's Anthropology From
the Pragmatic Standpoint where he pokes fun at "scholarly women ... [who]
use their books somewhat like a watch, . . . [which they wear] so it can be
noticed that they have one, although it is usually broken or does not show the
correct time."' 37 Nor is it his questionable endorsement of "the people's duty to
30 Id. at 159.
31 Id. at 52.
32 KANT, supra note 17, at 486.
31 See id..
34 Id. at 482.
35 Id., KANT, supra note 19, at 42.
36 Id. at 116.
37 See KANT, supra note 26, at 221.
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endure even the most intolerable abuse of supreme authority"3 8 or his support
of the estate-based society with "a superior class (entitled to command) and an
inferior class (which, although free and bound only by public law, is
predestined to obey the former)." 39 Inconsistent though such judgments are
with Kant's appeal to universal human dignity, they might have something to
do with his anxiety about the Prussian authorities' reaction to his free-spirited
discourse, the reaction that was decidedly negative at times. What makes one
cringe, however, is the cruelty ingrained in specific legal opinions he ventured
at the time. For the very man who theorized human dignity enthusiastically
endorsed the death penalty, insisted that a woman should die rather than submit
to rape,4° and ranted about "the disgrace of an illegitimate child ... [who] has
crept surreptitiously into the commonwealth (much like prohibited wares [con-
traband]), so that its existence as well as its destruction can be ignored."41
Equally troubling are his ravings against crimen carnis contra naturam, which
cover among other things homosexuality and masturbation, two crimes against
nature Kant went to a great length to expose, condemning the former as a dis-
grace to the human race and the latter as an abomination worse than suicide.42
To the modem conscience such counsel sounds like the very lapsusjudicii
Kant warned against in his theoretical discourse. What his legal opinions show
is that, for all his bold theoretical statements, Kant could not escape the herme-
neutical horizons of his time, that he shared the prejudices of his age which
drove him to pragmatic judgments inconsistent with his theoretical views. The
broader issue that this pragmatic-discursive misalignment raises is whether
Kant erred in assigning priority to abstract formula over pragmatic considera-
tions. The late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries saw a robust philosoph-
ical critique of Kant. One philosophy that challenged Kant's apriorism and
influenced legal thought in early twentieth century America was "pragmatism."
III. PRAGMATISTS RESPOND TO KANT
Before we examine the issues over which pragmatist philosophers parted
company with Kant, let's review the premises they all share. One such premise
is "universalism" which asserts that knowledge is public, that the knower who
raises a truth claim brings it on behalf of the entire community. Herein lies the
sociological import of the judgment a priori: it is made by an individual but
38 KANT, supra note 19, at 86.
39 See id. at 95-6.
40 According to Kant, if "a woman cannot preserve her life any longer except by surrender-
ing her person to the will of another, she is bound to give up her life rather than dishonour
humanity in her own person, which is what she would be doing in giving herself up as a
thing to the will of another." IMMANUEL KANT, LECTURES ON ETHICS 156 (Louis Infield
trans., 1979 ed., Hackett Publ'g Co. 1980) (1930).
41 See KANT, supra note 19, at 106.
42 See KANT, supra note 40, at 124. Kant views masturbation as perverse desire stirred up
by illicit imagination: "Lust is called unnatural if one is aroused to it not by a real object but
by his imagining it, so that he himself creates one, contrapurposively [sic]; . . . for in this
way imagination brings forth a desire contrary to nature's end .... " IMMANUEL KANT, THE
CAMBRIDGE EDITION OF THE WORKS OF IMMANUEL KANT, PRACTICAL PHILOSOPHY, THE




stakes a claim valid for everyone. We see the shades of this conviction in
Peirce, who thought that the knowledge pragmatists strive for - whether they
labor in the vineyards of philosophy, politics, or law - must be valid for the
entire human race. The pragmatic attitude embedded in logic and guiding pub-
lic affairs, according to Peirce, "inexorably requires that our interests shall not
be limited," that they "embrace the whole community. The community, again,
must not be limited, but must extend to all races of beings with whom we can
come into immediate or mediate intellectual relation. It must reach, however
vaguely, beyond the ideological epoch, beyond all bonds."43
Another pragmatist insight traceable to Kant concerns the key role
pragmatists assign to free inquiry as fodder for scientific and social progress.
John Dewey tirelessly spread the gospel of inquiry as a tool for gaining knowl-
edge and furthering commonwealth. Science, in this respect, is not so much a
store of reliable truths as a model of democracy in action, a blueprint for a
community where free discourse flourishes and all assertions are subject to crit-
ical inquiry: "[F]reedom of speech, toleration of diverse views, freedom of
communication, the distribution of what is found out to every individual as the
ultimate intellectual consumer, are involved in the democratic as in the scien-
tific method."''4
A quintessentially modem belief in the authority of every citizen to par-
ticipate in the national conversation and directly inform the political process is
yet another point on which Kant and pragmatists converged: "The idea of
democracy as opposed to any conception of aristocracy is that every individual
must be consulted in such a way, actively not passively, that he himself
becomes a part of the process of authority."45
One more paradigmatic conviction that pragmatists share with Kant is that
education rather than coercion is the way to improve social conditions and
bring about a better social order. The prospect for a better future "rests upon
persuasion, upon ability to convince and be convinced,"46 upon "the improve-
ment of the methods and conditions of debate, discussion and persuasion. That
is the problem of the public."47
Besides these similarities, several philosophical, methodological, and
political tenets separate pragmatists from Kant. The latter's apriorism came
under attack for its tendency to anoint as transcendentally valid precepts that
passed for settled knowledge at one point in time, be this women's inferiority,
crimes against nature, or immovable ether permeating physical space. To this
speculative approach pragmatists juxtaposed an experience-oriented philosophy
that acknowledged the constitutive role reason plays in production of the mean-
ingful world but that fastened attention on the socio-historical nature of the
categories and practices humans rely on to find their way in the continuously
evolving universe. The pragmatist alternatives to the Kantian transcendental
43 7 CHARLES S. PEIRCE, COLLECTED PAPERS OF CHARLES SANDERS PEIRCE (1931-58) 398
(Charles Hartshorne & Paul Weiss eds., Harvard Univ. Press 1960) (1931).
4 JOHN DEWEY, FREEDOM AND CULTURE 102 (Capricorn Books 1963) (1939).
45 JOHN DEWEY, PROBLEMS OF MEN 35 (Phil. Libr., Inc. 1968) (1946).
46 John Dewey, Organization in American Education, 17 TCHRS COLL. REC. 127, 134
(1916).
4' DEWEY, supra note 44, at 102.
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idealism can be summed up under the following headings: (1) philosophical
antifoundationalism, (2) epistemological consequentialism, (3) emergent deter-
minism, (4) embodied rationalism, (5) social perspectivism, and (6) political
progressivism. 48
A. Philosophical Antifoundationalism
Philosophical antifoundationalism rejects the notion that our knowledge
must be grounded in the immutable principles discovered a priori via transcen-
dental reflection, logical deliberation, or any other abstract theoretical proce-
dure. Kant's metaphysics draws attention away from the empirical world,
wasting an inordinate amount of time on first principles and a priori categories.
Pragmatists, by contrast, shun "terms abstracted from all their natural set-
tings."4 9 Pragmatist philosophy "has no dogmas, and no doctrines save its
method," according to William James; it is "looking away from first things,
principles, 'categories,' supposed necessities; and of looking towards last
things, fruits, consequences, facts."5 General principles and abstract ideas
have their place in knowledge, but only insofar as they prove themselves in
experience, in public affairs.
B. Epistemological Consequentialism
Epistemological consequentialism counsels caution regarding truth claims
whose status cannot be empirically validated. While Kant opposed "inferring
the truth of some knowledge from the truth of its consequences, pragmatists
turn such an inquiry into a maxim. They will not admit a synthetic (nonanalyti-
cal) statement as true unless it can be demonstrated in concrete situations,
through practical consequences vouching for the proposition's validity. "The
truth of an idea is not a stagnant property inherent in it. Truth happens to an
idea. It becomes true, is made true by events .... Its validity is the process of
its valid-ation."52 Peirce extends epistemological consequentialism to all sci-
entific concepts, whose meaning he proposes to ascertain via this famous prag-
matist maxim: "Consider what effects, that might conceivably have practical
bearings, we conceive the object of our conception to have. Then, our concep-
tion of these effects is the whole of our conception of the object."5 3 James,
who did much to popularize Peirce (sometimes to the latter's great consterna-
tion), rephrases this maxim as follows: "the meaning of any proposition can
always be brought down to some particular consequence in our future practical
48 A more detailed discussion of the pragmatist premises can be found in Dmitri N. Shalin,
Pragmatism and Social Interactionism, 51 AM. Soc. REV. 9 (1986). See also HANS JOAS,
PRAGMATISM AND SOCIAL THEORY (1993); EUGENE ROCHBERG-HALTON, MEANING AND
MODERNITY: SOCIAL THEORY IN THE PRAGMATIC ATITITUDE (1986); RICHARD SHUSTERMAN,
PRACTICING PHILOSOPHY: PRAGMATISM AND PHILOSOPHICAL LIFE (1997).
'9 WILLIAM JAMES, THE MEANING OF TRUTH 283 (Univ. of Mich. Press, 1970) (1909).
50 WILLIAM JAMES, PRAGMATISM & FOUR ESSAYS FROM THE MEANING OF TRUTH 47 (Ralph
B. Perry ed., Meridian Books 1955) (1907).
51 See KANT, supra note 17, at 507.
52 See JAMES, supra note 50, at 133.
53 See PEIRCE, supra note 16, at 31.
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experience, whether passive or active."'54 That is, we should not admit in scien-
tific discourse concepts which cannot be spelled out in operational terms, nor
should we waste time on propositions which stake demonstrably unverifiable
truth claims.
C. Emergent Determinism
Emergent determinism rejects the idealist view of the universe as fully
determined in its internal structure and waiting to be apprehended in a final
theoretical schema. "[Flor rationalism reality is ready-made and complete
from all eternity while for pragmatism it is still in the making."55 Our world is
in flux, its natural state is that of indeterminacy, and it remains indeterminate
until the knower terminates this "buzzing confusion" by imposing on it a termi-
nological scheme that foregrounds some elements just as it backgrounds others.
Or as James put it in one of his poetic moments: "Other sculptors, other statues
from the same stone! Other minds, other worlds from the same monotonous
and inexpressive chaos! My world is but one in a million alike embedded,
alike real to those who may abstract them."5 6 We can put this precept in a
more contemporary idiom by saying that reason is a participant observer, an
agency that leaves its mark on the world, even though the agent is often oblivi-
ous of its constitutive role. "[Any view that holds that man is part of nature,
not outside it," explains Dewey, "will certainly hold ... that indeterminacy in
human experience, once experience is taken in the objective sense of interact-
ing behavior and not as a private conceit added on to [sic] something totally
alien to it, is evidence of some corresponding indeterminateness in the process
of nature within which man exists (acts) and out of which he arose."
57
Whatever determinacy we find in this "pluralistic universe ' 58 is of our own
making. We put a perspective on the world to render it meaningful, make a
choice between conflicting experiences to make sense of them, and choose a
terminological frame to bring out one or another pattern submerged in chaotic
crosscurrents.
D. Embodied Rationalism
Embodied rationalism reconnects reason to the rest of the human body.
Reason is at its best when it harnesses its affect, reins in its cold-blooded
abstractions through intelligence native to sentiment. For a rationalist like
Kant, reason is a disembodied agency that deliberately suppresses its passions
to gain a clear picture of objective reality. Pragmatists, on the other hand,
protest the "hypostatiz[ation] of cognitive behavior," 5 9 warn against "imminent
extinction at the hand of unhinged reason,"60 and claim along with Peirce that
54 See JAMES, supra note 49, at 210.
55 See id. at 167.
56 1 WILLIAM JAMES, THE PRINCIPLES OF PSYCHOLOGY 289 (Dover Publ'n 1950) (1890).
57 See DEWEY, supra note 45, at 351.
58 WILLIAM JAMES, ESSAYS IN RADICAL EMPIRICISM AND PLURALISTIC UNIVERSE (P. Smith
1967) (1912).
'9 RICHARD RORTY, CONSEQUENCES OF PRAGMATISM 201 (1982).
6 EUGENE ROCHBERG-HALTON, MEANING AND MODERNITY: SOCIAL THEORY IN THE PRAG-
MATIC ATTITUDE 144 (1986).
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"[r]eason, anyway, is a faculty of secondary rank. Cognition is but the superfi-
cial film of the soul, while sentiment penetrates its substance."' 61 "'Reason' as a
noun," Dewey concurs, "signifies the happy cooperation of a multitude of dis-
positions, such as sympathy, curiosity, exploration, experimentation, frankness,
pursuit - to follow things through - circumspection, to look about context, etc.,
etc."6 2 New pragmatists like Richard Rorty built on this premise their critique
of conventional rationality: "Another meaning of 'rational' is, in fact, availa-
ble. In this sense, the word means something like 'sane' or 'reasonable' rather
than 'methodical.' It names a set of moral virtues: tolerance, respect for the
opinions of those around one, willingness to listen, reliance on persuasion
rather than force."6 3 This pragmatist emphasis on the noncognitive sources of
intelligence thematizes the discrepancy between our discursive and affective
performances. It also rehabilitates passion as an embodied state compatible
with virtue and conducive to social change.
E. Sociological Perspectivism
Sociological perspectivism reminds us that, contrary to Kant, the knower
does not cogitate in isolation, alongside equally autonomous subjects, that "the
very origin of the conception of reality shows that this conception essentially
involves the notion of community," ' and the real problem is "how to fix
belief, not in the individual merely, but in the community."6 5 The individual
belongs to society, and society stamps each mind with its blueprints, so that
"the mind that appears in individuals is not as such [an] individual mind.' 66 A
modem individual belongs to several groups at once, each one furnishing a
different perspective on reality. It is on the intersection of such publicly
defined perspectives that we discover what reality is, and this reality is bound
to be multiple, pluralistic, tinged with uncertainty, and open to conflicting inter-
pretations. Our take on the world is mediated by a historically constituted col-
lectivity that supplies us with terminological frames in terms of which we
terminate indeterminacy to produce a meaningful world. As community mem-
bers, we rely on language, and "[l]anguage does not simply symbolize a situa-
tion or object which is already there.., it makes possible the existence or the
appearance of that situation or object, for it is a part of the mechanism whereby
that situation or object is created."' 67 This approach to reality as socially bound
and continuously emergent engenders a pragmatist conception of society as
social interaction. Institutional realities, according to pragmatist sociology,
61 4 CHARLES S. PEIRCE, THE NEW ELEMENTS OF MATHEMATICS, at xxi (Carolyn Eisele ed.,
1976).
62 JOHN DEWEY, HUMAN NATURE AND CONDUCT: AN INTRODUCTION TO SOCIAL PSYCHOL-
oGY 196 (Modem Library ed., Random House 1950) (1922).
63 Richard Rorty, Science as Solidarity, in THE RHETORIC OF THE HUMAN SCIENCES: LAN-
GUAGE AND ARGUMENT IN SCHOLARSHIP AND PUBLIC AFFAIRS 40 (John S. Nelson et al. eds.,
1987).
64 See PEIRCE, supra note 16, at 247.
65 Id. at 13.
66 JOHN DEWEY, EXPERIENCE AND NATURE 219 (Dover ed., Dover Publ'ns 1958) (2d ed.
1929).




should not be treated as entities hovering above our heads. Social structures
must be traced all the way down to face-to-face interactions and redeemed in
experiential terms and affect-laden observations. "Society not only continues
to exist by transmission, by communication, but it may be fairly said to exist in
transmission, in communication. 68
F. Political Progressivism
Political progressivism is one more feature present in historical pragma-
tism, whose proponents are generally open to change and social amelioration.
At the same time, pragmatists do not espouse a definite political creed or urge
specific policies. Peirce was probably the least progressivist in his political
instincts. He disdained trade unionism, fretted about "the lowest class
insist[ing] on enslaving the upper class," and expressed "hopes that the gov-
erning class will use some common sense to maintain their rule. ' 69 His fellow
pragmatists were more in tune with the changing times and mores, convinced
that the social structure of American capitalism had to be updated, that "ideas
are worthless except as they pass into actions which rearrange and reconstruct
in some way, be it little or large, the world in which we live."7 Toward the
end of his life, James came close to endorsing "the more or less socialistic
future towards which mankind seems drifting."'7 ' Dewey was also deeply
impressed with socialism before he rallied behind a robust social democratic
agenda premised on the notion that "liberalism must become radical in the
sense that, instead of using social power to ameliorate the evil consequences of
the existing system, it shall use social power to change the system."'72 Today's
pragmatists stress with Richard Posner that pragmatist philosophy has "no
inherent political valence," 73 an observation borne out by a broad spectrum of
political beliefs found among pragmatists, ranging from Rorty's aesthetically
tinged libertarianism 74 to Cornell West's "prophetic pragmatism." 75 This polit-
ical ambivalence notwithstanding, pragmatist thinkers of the old and new
school have been critical of existing institutions and open to ameliorative social
change, even though the direction of this change and its specific forms are
subject to a continuous debate.
A note of caution about the suggested six-point list is in order - it should
not be taken as exhaustive. The best way to see it is as an "ideal type" or a
theoretical construct which judges an empirical phenomenon by the extent to
68 JOHN DEWEY, DEMOCRACY AND EDUCATION: AN INTRODUCTION TO THE PHILOSOPHY OF
EDUCATION 5 (1916).
69 Charles S. Peirce, Letter to Victoria Welby (Dec. 14, 1908), in SEMIOTICS AND SIGNIFICS:
THE CORRESPONDENCE BETWEEN CHARLES S. PEIRCE AND LADY WELBY 79 (Charles S. Har-
wick ed., 1977).
70 JOHN DEWEY, QUESTS FOR CERTAINTY: A STUDY OF THE RELATION OF KNOWLEDGE AND
ACTION 138 (Capricorn Books ed., G.P. Putnam Son's 1960) (1929).
71 William James, The Moral Equivalent of War, in THE PROGRESSIVE YEARS: THE SPIRIT
AND ACHIEVEMENT OF AMERICAN REFORM 488 (Otis Pease ed., 1962).
72 See DEWEY, supra note 45, at 136.
73 See Posner, What Has Pragmatism to Offer Law?, in PRAGMATISM IN LAW AND SOCIETY,
supra note 8, at 29, 35.
74 RICHARD RORTY, CONTINGENCY, IRONY, AND SOLIDARITY (1989).
71 CORNELL WEST, THE CORNELL WEST READER 147 (1999).
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which it approximates the construct, even though no claim is made that the case
in point is a pure instance of a given kind.7 6 Pragmatists do not see eye to eye
on every issue. Some may well disavow a particular premise on the six-point
list.77 With the possible exception of Habermas, few would endorse today
Peirce's Kantian belief that "[t]he opinion which is fated to be ultimately
agreed by all who investigate, is what we mean by truth, and the object repre-
sented in this opinion is the real."78 Nor is every pragmatist comfortable with
James's free-wheeling pragmatism that "is willing to take anything, to follow
either logic or the senses and to count the humblest and most personal . . .
[even] mystical experiences if they have practical consequences. 7 9 In today's
pragmatist camp, some are uneasy about Rorty's libertarian aestheticism, others
feel Fish has gone too far deploring theory, and quite a few disavow Posner's
market-knows-best perspective on law. What pragmatists share is a set of atti-
tudes present to various degrees in individual thinkers, yet revealing enough of
a common ferment to suggest a "family resemblance[ ],80 I borrow this last
metaphor from Ludwig Wittgenstein, whom pragmatists readily claim as their
own.81 If we push this metaphor a bit further, we can say that things aren't
always tranquil in the pragmatist family. Indeed, they get rather nasty at times,
as family members fight for a competitive advantage and promote their own
brand of pragmatism. With this in mind, we now turn to legal pragmatism.
IV. JURISTS RESPOND TO PRAGMATISM
The term "legal pragmatism" is of relatively recent vintage. It did not
come into wide circulation until the 1980's, though the phenomenon itself is at
least a hundred years old, dating back to Oliver Wendell Holmes and Benjamin
Cardozo, two distinguished American legal minds who gave pragmatic juris-
prudence a strong impetus still felt today. Holmes was a founding member of
the Metaphysical Club (along with Peirce, James, Green, and Chauncey
Wright), where the pragmatist salvo first sounded in the early 1870's. Yet,
Holmes had few good things to say about fellow pragmatists. He found
James's Pragmatism superfluous and confided to a friend that "the judging of
law by its effects and results did not have to wait for W[illiam] J[ames] or
Pound for its existence."'82 Although Cardozo was more indebted to legal real-
ism than to pragmatism, he, unlike Holmes, cited Dewey and James as philo-
76 See MAX WEBER, THE METHODOLOGY OF THE SOCIAL SCIENCES 104-05 (Edward A. Shils
& Henry A. Finch trans., Free Press 1949).
7 "Neither the old nor the new pragmatism is a school," writes Posner. "The differences
between a Peirce and a James . .. . and a Dewey, are profound. The differences among
current advocates of pragmatism are even more profound, making it possible to find greater
affinities across than within the 'schools."' Posner, supra note 73, at 34.
78 See PEIRCE, supra note 16, at 38.
79 See JAMES, supra note 50, at 61.
80 LUDWIG WITIGENSTEIN, PHILOSOPHICAL INVESTIGATIONS 32e (G.E.M. Anscombe trans.,
2d ed. 1958) (1953).
81 See RORTY, supra note 8, at 96 n.17; POSNER, supra note 7, at 464.
82 Richard A. Posner, Introduction to OLIVER WENDELL HOLMES JR., THE ESSENTIAL
HOLMES: SELECTIONS FROM THE LETTERS, SPEECHES, JUDICIAL OPINIONS, AND OTHER WRIT-
INGS OF OLIVER WENDELL HOLMES, JR., at xxiv (Richard A. Posner ed., 1992).
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sophical authorities and fondly repeated the pragmatist maxim. 83 When it
comes to their pronouncements on law and specific legal holdings, however,
both Holmes and Cardozo displayed the signature pragmatic skepticism about
immutable principles, a respect for changing community mores, an appetite for
fact-finding inquiry, and a willingness to support reform. Holmes's celebrated
opening in his Common Law can be read as a creedal statement of legal
pragmatism:
The life of the law has not been logic: it has been experience. The felt necessities of
the time, the prevalent moral and political theories, institutions of public policy,
avowed or unconscious, even the prejudices which judges share with their fellow-
men, have had a good deal more to do than the syllogism in determining the rules by
which men should be governed.84
From his early years as a private attorney and throughout his distinguished
service on the Supreme Juridical Court of Massachusetts and the United States
Supreme Court, Holmes practiced the jurisprudence of pragmatic compromise,
refusing to privilege civil rights, judicial discretion, political expediency, or any
other principle while drawing freely on them when the situation warranted. In
keeping with epistemological consequentialism, Holmes redefined concepts
like "right," "liberty," "contract," and "property" in a way that stripped them of
their metaphysical halo and brought to the fore their hard-boiled practical
implications. "But for legal purposes a right is only the hypostasis of a proph-
ecy," proclaimed Holmes, and it owes its efficacy to "the fact that the public
force will be brought to bear upon those who do things said to contravene it."85
When the right in question is enforced intermittently, its objective status comes
into question, and when a specific liberty is no longer backed by administrative
force, it matters not if society continues to pay lip service to it - such a liberty
is but a legal fiction. Looked at from this angle, the meaning of a legal princi-
ple no longer pivots out on itself. Rather, it grows with the circumstances and
absorbs the changing historical climate, its objectivity treated as a variable
reflecting specific context and not as a property inherent in the principle.
"Contract" is another legal precept which does not owe its efficacy to
some major premise enshrined in constitutional tracts and guiding inquiry to an
inevitable conclusion. Contract ultimately refers to the practical consequences
likely to befall those who enter a legal agreement. An unscrupulous business-
man - a "bad man" as Holmes called him famously, "does not care two straws
for the axioms or deductions, but.., he does want to know what the Massachu-
setts or English courts are likely to do in fact. I am much of his mind. The
prophecies of what the courts will do in fact, and nothing more pretentious, are
what I mean by the law." 86 To determine what restraints the government can
impose on the freedom of contract, it is not enough to perform a logical syllo-
83 See BENJAMIN N. CARDOZO, GROWTH OF THE LAW 46 (1924), reprinted in SELECTED
WRITINGS OF BENJAMIN NATHAN CARDOZO 205 & n. 21 (Margaret E. Hall ed., 1947); BEN-
JAMIN N. CARoOZO, PARADOXES OF LEGAL SCIENCE passim (1947), reprinted in SELECTED
WRITINGS OF BENJAMIN NATHAN CARDOzo, supra, passim.
84 HOLMES, supra note 82, at 237.
85 Oliver Wendell Holmes, Jr., Natural Law, 32 HARV. L. REV. 40, 42 (1918), reprinted in
HOLMES, supra note 82, at 182.
86 Oliver Wendell Holmes, Jr., The Path of the Law, 10 HARV. L. REV. 457, 460-61 (1897),
reprinted in HOLMES, supra note 82, at 163.
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gism, to construe a statute in light of its plain language, to let a constitutional
principle speak for itself - one also has to take into account changing commu-
nity standards and the statute's impact on the parties involved.
The voluminous batch of legal opinions bearing his name attest to
Holmes's pragmatic convictions that "[g]eneral propositions do not decide con-
crete cases," that courts had rightfully been "cutting down the liberty to con-
tract by way of combination," and that a statute limiting working hours under
hazardous conditions was not an infringement on the employers' constitutional
rights to contract freely but a "proper measure on the score of health."87 In a
dissenting opinion Holmes entered in Adkins v. Children's Hospital, he appeals
to the "industrial peace" as the ground for rejecting the constitutional reasons
the majority invoked to strike down a law "forbid[ding] employment at rates
below those fixed as the minimum requirement of health and right living." 8
The same activist reasoning informs his numerous judgments, many held in
dissent, that endeared Holmes to progressive politicians of his time and infuri-
ated laissez-faire enthusiasts. A rare occasion on the U.S. Supreme Court, dis-
sent would become increasingly common after Holmes, who used it to
articulate the nascent community values inviting a fresh look at the Constitu-
tion. Rationales behind his specific decisions varied, but the willingness to go
beyond the precedent, to give a novel reading to time-honored principles in
light of changing community standards, remains the hallmark of Holmes's
method throughout his tenure on the U.S. Supreme Court.
Following his illustrious predecessors on the Supreme Court, Cardozo
linked his judicial perspective to the common law tradition with its benign view
of judicial discretion and sensitivity to evolving policy concerns. More than
Holmes, Cardozo was willing to theorize the principles underlying his jurispru-
dence, to trace their intellectual roots and credit his philosophical comrades in
arm: "[T]he juristic philosophy of the common law is at bottom the philosophy
of pragmatism. Its truth is relative, not absolute. The rule that functions well
produces a title deed to recognition." 89 His is a theory of the legal process that
focuses on law-in-use or law-in-the-making - law as it manifests itself in a
judgment rendered upon a particular situation with a specific set of circum-
stances to contend with. Cardozo captured the emergent determinism germane
to the legal system in this trenchant formula: "Law never is, but is always
about to be. It is realized only when embodied in a judgment, and in being
realized, expires. There are no such things as rules or principles: there are only
isolated dooms." 90 Law, in other words, becomes pragmatically meaningful
when applied to the full range of cases whose adjudication determines the
proper scope and meaning of the law. Before a legal judgment is passed, the
situation remains open to multiple determinations just as the law invites dispa-
rate, conflicting interpretations. The judge terminates indeterminacy by select-
87 Lochner v. New York, 198 U.S. 45, 75-76 (1905) (Holmes, J., dissenting), reprinted in
HOLMES, supra note 82, at 306.
88 Adkins v. Children's Hosp. of the District of Columbia, 261 U.S. 525, 570-71 (1923)
(Holmes, J., dissenting), reprinted in HOLMES, supra note 82, at 308-09.
89 BENJAMIN N. CARDOZO, THE NATURE OF THE JUDICIAL PROCESS 102-03 (1921),
reprinted in SELECTED WRITINGS OF BENJAMIN NATHAN CARDOZO, supra note 83, at 149.
90 Id. at 126.
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ing a terminological frame from the current stock of laws, principles, and
precedents, achieving in the process what Dewey calls in his theory of inquiry
the "transformation of an indeterminate unsettled situation into a determinate
unified existential situation. '"91 To "terminate" means two opposite things
here: "to define, to delimit the sense" as well as "to extinguish, to bring to an
end." By choosing particular terminological means of discursive production,
we do justice to the situation at the cost of doing violence to its alternative
determinations, some of which, preserved for posterity in dissenting opinions,
might ground future determinations. Laws and legal canons we use to termi-
nate the indeterminacy may be thoroughly codified, but for all their formal
rigor legal principles routinely get in each other's way, leaving professionals
ample room to argue which one takes precedent in the case at bar. Indeed, the
function the legal lore plays in juridical practice is not altogether dissimilar to
the folklore where proverbs strategically contradict each other, and where this
very multivocity serves a practical purpose by allowing the user to invoke a
maxim most suitable for the situation and amenable to the interpreter's agenda.
By rendering the situation officially meaningful, legal judgment bears the
double burden of doing justice to the unique fact pattern and sustaining law as a
semi-coherent system - the two objectives that often work at cross-purpose.
With this turn of argument, the locus of the judicial process shifts to legal
judgment which instantiates a universal law in the case at bar just as it univer-
salizes the case particulars into court certified facts. The law in question may
seem to leave little or no room for disagreement, but the determinacy the legal
judgment confers on the situation is always something socio-historically emer-
gent rather than a priori - ahistorically - true. This certainty is a product of the
ongoing interpretation process that stretches back for generations. Once the
community sense of right and wrong has changed, the interpretive process
ceases to be routine, novel fact patterns are discerned, and old principles are
given new ostensible definitions. Legislators play their part in codifying the
most enduring social changes, but the logistics of statutory law enactment is too
slow and unwieldy to keep pace with the continually evolving reality. And so,
it often falls on the courts to lead the way in articulating the changing commu-
nity values and establishing in situ the emergent meaning of a particular law
and of the Constitution as a whole. Justice John Marshall is one example Car-
dozo cited to illustrate how a judge at once expresses emerging national needs
and helps channel them along: "He gave to the constitution of the United
States the impress of his own mind; and the form of our constitutional law is
what it is, because he moulded it while it was still plastic and malleable in the
fire of his own intense convictions."92 Judges are more than neutral transmit-
ters for immutable principles; they apply the rules in situ, remaining faithful to
the constitutional ethos while adjusting the settled principles to the community
mores continuously evolving with the passage of time. Thus, it is imperative
for judges to ask, "Does liberty mean the same thing for successive genera-
tions? May restraints that were arbitrary yesterday be useful and rational and
therefore lawful today? May restraints that are arbitrary today become useful
91 JOHN DEWEY, LOGIC: THE THEORY OF INQUIRY 296 (1938).
92 See CARDOZO, supra note 89, at 169-70, reprinted in SELECTED WRITINGS OF BENJAMIN
NATHAN CARDOZO, supra note 83, at 179.
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and rational and therefore lawful tomorrow? I have no doubt," Cardozo con-
cludes, "that the answer to these questions must be yes."
93
This pragmatic jurisprudence was marked by an increasing reliance on
social science research used by judges to justify their ruling. Economic, socio-
logical, and epidemiological data was in particular demand, as legal scholars
angled for a construction promising to breathe new life into the old laws:
Courts know today that statutes are to be viewed, not in isolation or in vacuo, as
pronouncements of abstract principles for the guidance of an ideal community, but in
the setting and the framework of present-day conditions, as revealed by the labors of
economists and students of the social sciences in our own country and abroad."
94
Legal inquiry extends beyond the study of relevant statutes and precedents
- it encompasses the legislative history, the present day social conditions, and
the latest empirical data bearing on the pending judgment.
An increased attention to speech conditions advancing the democratic pro-
cess is another prominent feature of pragmatist jurisprudence. When govern-
ment or corporate interests work to suppress critical opinions, judges should err
on the side of allowing even extreme views (like those of the socialist leader
Eugene Debs) to reach the public ear. This is what Justice Holmes urged when
he wrote in his famous dissent in Abrams v. United Sates that "the ultimate
good desired is better reached by free trade in ideas - that the best test of truth
is the power of the thought to get itself accepted in the competition of the
market .... That at any rate is the theory of our Constitution." 95
One more aspect of the pragmatist current in legal thought needs to be
singled out. I am talking about the oft admired rhetorical power of the written
corpus Holmes and Cardozo left to posterity. Posner believes that Holmes is
read today not so much because he spawned innovative legal opinions but
because of the superb style in which his judgments are clothed, even when his
specific legal opinions are flawed.96 I see this dimension of early legal prag-
matism as reflecting its proponents' commitment to embodied reasonableness.
However intellectually grounded, a constitutional principle or a statutory enact-
ment cannot be effective unless it affects our minds as well as emotions. This
is where rhetoric is called upon to play a part, for its office is to shake our
convictions, move us toward a new way of seeing, and stir one into actions that
change the shape of things. Good rhetoric is something you cannot readily
ignore. It plants in your soma the nagging seeds of doubt and tender hooks of
hope which pull you by your guts, compelling you to confront your prejudices
and realign your action with you beliefs. Cardozo urged jurists to pay close
attention to the noncognitive springs of other people's - and their own - con-
duct: "Deep below consciousness are other forces, the likes and the dislikes,
93 Id. at 76-77.
94 Id. at 139.
9 Abrams v. United States, 250 U.S. 616 (1919) (Holmes, J., dissenting), reprinted in
HOLMES, supra note 82, at 320.
96 Richard A. Posner, Introduction to HOLMES, supra note 82, at xvi-xvii. Elsewhere, Pos-
ner asserts that the nations' most esteemed and rhetorically gifted Justices - Holmes, Car-
dozo, Jackson, Hand, and Brandeis - were pragmatist in their legal practice if not in their




the predilections and the prejudices, the complex of instincts and emotions and
habits and convictions, which make the man, whether he be litigant or judge."9 7
Mastering rhetorical tools is one way legal professionals can achieve their ulti-
mate goal of furthering justice, order, and peace in society.
As for their political agenda, we should not take the legal pragmatists'
openness to change as a sign of their personal political preferences. Holmes's
dicta often sounds progressive, as for instance, when he opines "that legislation
should easily and quickly, yet not too quickly, modify itself in accordance with
the will of the de facto supreme power in the community and ... spread ... an
educated sympathy [to] reduce the sacrifice of minorities to a minimum."98
But if you read closely the rationales he proffers for desired policy objectives,
you discover how firmly his sentiments were rooted in nineteenth century
Social Darwinism. 9 Holmes was a true believer in the struggle for survival
that demands the sacrifice of the weakest. The law should interfere in this
evolutionary struggle only to the extent necessary to give all groups a fair
chance to compete. Society is within its rights to enlist law to expedite the
extinction of a group no longer able to fight for itself or contribute to societal
welfare. This is why Holmes voted to uphold a Virginia law permitting invol-
untary sterilization in Buck v. Bell, with this rationalization to buttress his case:
"We have seen more than once that the public welfare may call upon the best
citizens for their lives. It would be strange if it could not call upon those who
already sap the strength of the State for these lesser sacrifices."' °
As a member of the religious minority who saw discrimination firsthand,
Cardozo showed no traces of nativism found in the upper crust American pro-
gressivism of this era. He was not given to doubt about the wisdom of reform
afflicting his distinguished predecessor on the Supreme Court. To the end he
remained convinced that "[t]he final cause of law is the welfare of society."' '1
He supported wholeheartedly the New Deal laws, often finding himself in the
minority on the Court, yet pressing his case with dignity and flare, occasionally
convincing the majority to reverse itself and endorse his views. There is
warmth to his prose, an apparent absence of malice disguised as humility that
sometimes mars Holmes's judgment. You sense this in his demeanor as well as
his rhetoric; you want to believe that Cardozo embodied in personal conduct
the pragmatist virtues he professed in theory. This alignment between pragma-
tist discourse and practical action would not become an issue until legal
pragmatists were ready to move beyond the traditional legal venues into town
9' CARDOZO, supra note 89, at 167, reprinted in SELECTED WRITINGS OF BENJAMIN
NATHAN CARDOZO, supra note 83, at 178.
98 HOLMES, supra note 82, at 122.
99 "Why should the greatest numbers be preferred?," asks Holmes. "Why not the greatest
good of the most intelligent and most highly developed? The greatest good of a minority of
our generation may be the greatest good of the greatest number in the long run." Oliver
Wendell Holmes, Jr., The Gas-Stokers' Strike, 7 AM. L. REv. 582, 584 (1873), reprinted in
HOLMES, supra note 82, at 122.
10t Buck v. Bell, 274 U.S. 200, 207 (1927), quoted in Louis MENAND, THE METAPHYSICAL
CLUB: A STORY OF IDEAS IN AMERICA 66 (2001).
101 See CARDOZO, supra note 89, at 66, reprinted in SELECTED WRITINGS OF BENJAMIN
NATHAN CARDozo, supra note 83, at 133.
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halls and mediation forums where they could rejoin other citizens in shaping
America's democratic process.
V. THE RESURGENCE OF LEGAL PRAGMATISM
Legal pragmatism is much in the news these days, in both the popular and
scholarly press. It raises unsettling questions, fights an established dogma, yet
offers few clear-cut solutions to the problems afflicting today's jurisprudence.
And these problems are legion, according Richard Posner. The U.S. legal sys-
tem is "much too solemn and self-important," "too marmoreal, hieratic, and
censorious," "too theocratic," while its practitioners are apt to show "too much
confidence," "too little curiosity," "too much emphasis on authority, certitude,
rhetoric, and tradition," and "too little on consequences and on social-scientific
techniques."' 10 2 In sharp contrast to this moribund picture is a paradigm Posner
offers to his colleagues as a philosophical alternative which invites a sober look
at "the limitations of human reason," accepts "the unattainability of 'truth',"
takes "problems concretely, experimentally, without illusions," acknowledges
the inexorable "'localness' of human knowledge," and urges that "social
thought and action be evaluated as instruments to valued human goals rather
than as ends in themselves." 10 3 The name of this paradigm is pragmatism.
Alas, if you are a lawyer or a judge, there is not much you can do with it. It is
more of an attitude than a creed, more a mood than a practical guide to action;
its most trenchant advice to professionals curious about a "method of pragmatic
jurisprudence" is to practice "kicking ... sacred cows" 1" and keep "muddling
through."'" 5
Kicking sacred cows is indeed a favorite pastime of many legal
pragmatists, so much so that you begin to wonder if such cruelty to animals is
really conducive to reasoned discourse. Fortunately, there is more to pragma-
tist jurisprudence than name calling and the avowal of faith. We get a better
sense of what legal pragmatists are up to when we move beyond their program-
matic statements and examine their specific legal judgments. A good place to
start is the robust pragmatist defense Stanley Fish offers to laws supporting
affirmative action. 106
In a piece titled When Principles Stand in the Way, Fish takes to task both
the proponents and opponents of affirmative action for their misguided efforts
to ground their policy objectives in a priori principles. One example of the
futile search for such a neutral standard is Wechsler's article about the decision
in Brown v. Board of Education, where the author, troubled by the Supreme
Court's failure to procure a major theoretical premise for its pragmatic decision
to allow school integration, offers a "general principle whose application would
yield that result independently."10 7 The principle general enough to allow the
right deduction, Wechsler proposed, is "the right of freedom of association."
102 POSNER, supra note 7, at 465.
103 Id.
104 Id. at 466.
105 Posner, supra note 73, at 43.




However, the application of the principle yielded paradoxical results: If segre-
gation denies excluded minorities the right to free association, then forced inte-
gration coerces into an association those who wish to avoid it. Either way, the
facts on the ground would not square off with the Constitutional principle,
which sounds unimpeachable in its formal sense but proves to be divisive when
applied to real life situations. The solution Fish offers is pragmatic: Don't let a
good principle stand in the way of a sound policy. "A principle scorns actual
historical circumstances and moves quickly to a level of generalization and
abstraction so high that the facts of history can no longer be seen."10 8 The
policy in question is a sound one - to remedy the insidious consequences of
institutional racism that marred social relations in America for generations.
You get nowhere when you have "substituted philosophical urgencies for social
urgencies" in such cases. Worse than that, you give ammunition to and stir up
bitter opposition from the opponents of social integration who are only too
happy to cover their bigoted motives by taking refuge in hallowed principles.
Fish quotes Justice Stevens's plain words that set the matter straight in the
controversies surrounding affirmative action: '"There is no moral or Constitu-
tional equivalence between a policy that is designed to perpetuate a caste sys-
tem and one that seeks to eradicate racial subordination." 10 9 By reverting to
neutral principles like "fairness," "equality," "merit," or "color-blindness," Fish
contends, you are really "playing on your opponent's field and thus buying into
his position."11 The brief for pragmatist jurisprudence concludes with this
plea:
Let's be done with code words and concentrate on the problems we face and on
possible ways of solving them. Those who support affirmative action should give up
searching for theoretical consistency - a goal at once impossible and unworthy - and
instead seek strategies with the hope of relieving the pain of people who live in the
world and not in the never-never land of theory.
111
Less hostile to legal principles and theoretical considerations is the posi-
tion articulated by Orlando Patterson. His article titled Affirmative Action: The
Sequel, defends affirmative action on the pragmatic ground of policy objectives
and cost effectiveness. Several decades after the courts threw their support
behind affirmative action, we can see the progress made: fewer ethnic riots,
racial integration at major universities, more heterogeneous professional elites,
gains in the African-American middle class, and the emergence of a global
popular culture where minorities play a key role. This progress has had its cost
born in part by the whites, but this cost was modest. As befitting a pragmati-
cally driven legal argument, Patterson cites research data to back up his claim:
"[N]o more than 7 percent of Americans of European heritage claim to have
been adversely affected by affirmative action programs." '12 While Patterson
acknowledges that "affirmative action violates fundamental principles that have
guided this country" and that it is "difficult to reconcile affirmative action with
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does not shrink from the challenge, rightly pointing out that "America's history
is replete with just such pragmatic fudging of these ideals."' 1 3 Congress has
not hesitated in passing legislative acts that support special interests - multina-
tional corporations, millionaire farmers, oil-well drillers, mortgage owners, and
war veterans have benefited from these statutory enactments with dubious Con-
stitutional provenance. But there are red flags for the African-American lead-
ers who search for an overarching principle like "diversity" in which to ground
programs favoring minorities, for "many whites who were otherwise prepared
to turn a pragmatic blind eye to their principled concerns about affirmative
action" will not stand for ever-expanding entitlements benefiting minorities
who stake no claim to have been wronged in the past. 14 The affirmative action
legislation is unique, its purpose is "to redress the past wrongs," riot to indulge
in "the celebration of separate identities." Henceforth, one should stay clear of
"affirmative action as an entitlement, requiring little or no efforts on the part of
minorities." '15 Patterson concludes with an appeal to our pragmatic wisdom,
which does not require throwing away principles and bravely embraces the
inevitable clash between the cherished ideals enshrined in our Constitution:
Americans have always recognized that high ideals, however desirable, inevitably
clash with reality, and that good public policy requires compromise. But only
through the struggle of affirmative action are they coming to realize that such com-
promises, wisely pursued, can actually serve a higher principle: the supreme virtue
of being fair to those who have been most unfairly treated.' 16
Posner's latest book, Law, Pragmatism, and Democracy, offers more
examples of the pragmatic approach to litigation on highly divisive issues fac-
ing our nation. On Bush v. Gore, Posner offers "a pragmatic defense of the
Supreme Court's controversial decision." ' 1 7 He agrees with the critics that the
Court's rationale for its majority decision was flawed. This decision shows
how perilous the judgment often is when reached in haste under the conditions
of national emergency. "IT]he Justices' choice of the ground of decision, and
other strategic choices that various Justices made in the course of the litigation,
turned Bush v. Gore into a pragmatic donnybrook."' 18 Spurious though the
foundation on which the holding rests, it led to the right outcome. "The result
was defensible - and that matters a great deal to a pragmatist! It was not the
outrage to democracy and the rule of law that the critics of the decision have
claimed it was, unless the Justices' motives were as malign as some of their
critics have charged.""' 9 The due attention to the consequences is what makes
the ultimate decision, if not the Court's reasoning, correct, for "the danger that
there would be a Presidential succession crisis if the Court failed to intervene
was one of the pragmatic considerations that should have weighed (and perhaps
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The opposite is true of the outcome in Clinton v. Jones where the Court
failed to weigh the likely consequences of its decision to force the sitting presi-
dent to testify in a private law suit. It is fine to invoke principles like "no one is
above the law," but when the Supreme Court denied President Clinton the nar-
rowly crafted temporary immunity he sought from testifying in Paula Jones's
sexual harassment suit, it plunged the nation into the paralyzing spectacle
which lead to Clinton's impeachment.12 '
Posner also brings up kindred pragmatic arguments in cases involving the
First Amendment issues. He rejects the notion that "First Amendment free-
doms are 'absolute'," urging attention to "the relationship between pragmatic
adjudication and the use by judges of cost-benefit analysis in 'noneconomic'
cases." 122 On national security legislation like the Patriot Act, Posner defends
government actions, citing "the urgent need for taking a pragmatic approach to
cases that arise out of national emergencies - cases involving war, terrorism,
economic depression." 123 He asks judges to weigh carefully the consequences
that the constraints imposed on individual rights will have on the quality of life
and advocates measured, revisable compromises that reflect the nation's secur-
ity needs while preserving our liberties.
Pragmatic jurisprudence has secured a foothold in the nation's highest
judicial body. "The Supreme Court that upheld the new campaign finance law
on Wednesday," announces a typical newspaper article, "was a pragmatic
court, concerned less with the fine points of constitutional doctrine than with
the real world context and consequences of the intensely awaited decision."
' 124
Popular press credits several Justices with pragmatist virtues. David Souter
receives accolades from liberal commentators for his "brand of moderate prag-
matism and his willingness to engage Justice Scalia in direct intellectual com-
bat,"' 125 and so does Justice Sandra O'Connor - "the court's leading pragmatist
[who] cast only five dissenting votes in the entire term, far fewer than anyone
else, and was in the majority in 13 of the 18 most closely decided cases."12 6
But it is Justice Breyer who is rightly considered the premier theoretician of
legal pragmatism on the nation's highest court. His recent exchange with Jus-
tice Scalia - the Court's chief opponent of pragmatic jurisprudence - brings
into sharp focus the constitutional issues involved.
Scalia is a formidable opponent. His powerful - or sinister, as critics
allege - attacks on legal realism and its pragmatist heirs show the real stakes
we all have in this debate. In a speech Scalia gave at the University of Chicago
Divinity School, the Justice dramatized the constitutional issue involved:
As it is, however, the Constitution that I interpret and apply is not living but dead -
or, as I prefer to put it, enduring. It means today not what current society (much less
the Court) thinks it ought to mean, but what it meant when it was adopted. For me,
121 Id.
122 Id. at 23.
123 Id. at 386.
124 Linda Greenhouse, A Court Infused with Pragmatism, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 12, 2003, at
A38.
125 See David J. Garrow, Justice Souter Emerges, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 25, 1994, § 6 (Maga-
zine), at 64 (quoting Linda Greenhouse).
126 Linda Greenhouse, The Year Rehnquist May Have Lost the Court, N.Y. TIMES, July 5,
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therefore, the constitutionality of the death penalty is not a difficult, soul-wrenching
127question. It was clearly permitted when the Eighth Amendment was adopted ....
As this statement attests, Scalia is a proponent of "originalism" - an influ-
ential constitutional doctrine that appeals to the framers' original understanding
embodied in the text of the Constitution and steadfastly resisting efforts to tai-
lor its meaning to the changing community mores. 128  Scalia forswears
attempts "to impose our 'maturing' society's 'evolving standards of decency"'
on our Constitution. "That moral obligation may weigh heavily upon the voter,
and upon the legislator who enacts the laws," he states:
[blut a judge, I think, bears no moral guilt for the laws society has failed to enact.
Thus, my difficulty with Roe v. Wade is a legal rather than a moral one: I do not
believe (and, for two hundred years, no one believed) that the Constitution contains a
right to abortion. And if a state were to-permit abortion on demand, I would - and
could in good conscience - vote against an attempt to invalidate that law for the same
reason that I vote against the invalidation of laws that forbid abortion on demand:
because the Constitution gives the federal government (and hence me) no power over
the matter. 129
In the widely read Tanner Lecture on Human Values he delivered at
Princeton University, Scalia articulated his "philosophy of statutory construc-
tion in general (known loosely as textualism) and of constitutional construction
in particular (known loosely as originalism)."' 3 ° He did not spare sarcasm
about the brand of jurisprudence championed by Holmes and Cardozo and now
taught to first year law students who are plowed with stories about a wise judge
"running through earlier cases that leaves him free to impose that rule - distin-
guishing one prior case on his left, straight-arming another one on his right,
high-stepping away from another precedent about to tackle him from the rear
until (bravo!) he reaches his goal: good law."'13 1
Scalia takes pains to distinguish his "textualism" from "strict construction-
ism," the latter obstinately holding onto a literal sense of the law, the former
allowing that statutes "should be construed reasonably, to contain all that it
fairly means"'132 in line with the established "rules of interpretation called the
canons of construction."' 133  The point he strains to make is that we should
beware of adapting the Constitution to the political moods of the country, for:
It surely cannot be said that a constitution naturally suggests changeability; to the
contrary, its whole purpose is to prevent change - to embed certain rights in such a
manner that future generations cannot take them away.
127 Antonin Scalia, God's Justice and Ours, FIRST THINGS, May 2002, at 17-18, http://
www.firstthings.con/ftissues/ft0205/articles/scalia.html (last visited Feb. 15, 2005).
128 See David Hoy, Is Legal Originalism Compatible with Philosophical Pragmatism?, in
PRAGMATISM IN LAW AND SOCIETY, supra note 8, at 343 (describing the doctrine of
originalism).
129 Scalia, supra note 127, at 18.
13o Antonin Scalia, Common-Law Curs in a Civil-Law System: The Role of United States
Federal Courts in Interpreting the Constitution and Laws, Tanner Lecture at Princeton Uni-
versity (Mar. 8-9, 1995), in 18 THE TANNER LECTURE ON HUMAN VALUES 79 (1997).
131 Id. at 85.
132 Id. at 98
133 Id. at 100.
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If the courts are free to write the Constitution anew, they will, by God, write it the
way the majority wants .... This, of course, is the end of the Bill of Rights, whose
meaning will be committed to the very body it was meant to protect against: the
majority. t 34
Stephen Breyer responded to Scalia's spirited defense of originalism and
textualism in the James Madison Lecture he gave at the New York University
Law School, where he spelled out the interpretation cannons guiding jurispru-
dence steeped in the pragmatist ethos. 135 This particular brand of jurisprudence
espouses "an approach to constitutional interpretation that places considerable
weight upon consequences - consequences valued in terms of basic constitu-
tional purposes," a perspective that "disavows a contrary constitutional
approach, a more 'legalistic' approach that places too much weight upon lan-
guage, history, tradition, and precedent alone while understating the importance
of consequences."13 6 Central to Breyer's argument is the contention that the
U.S. Constitution embodies several complementary principles which sometime
work at cross-purpose. He lists five such objectives: "(1) democratic self-gov-
ernment, (2) dispersion of power (avoiding concentration of too much power in
too few hands), (3) individual dignity (through protection of individual liber-
ties), (4) equality before the law (through equal protection of the law), and (5)
the rule of law itself."' 137 According to Breyer, the problem with legal formal-
ists is that they fail to appreciate the importance of giving all these objectives
fair play. They focus on the dispersion of power and the rule of law yet over-
look other values encysted in the Constitution, particularly the need to foster
democratic self-government. Nevertheless, formalists cannot escape the very
fallacies of which they accuse their opponents, since their "'literalism' tends to
produce the legal doctrines (related to the First Amendment, to federalism, to
statutory interpretation, to equal protection) that . . . lead to consequences at
least as harmful, from a constitutional perspective, as any increased risk of
subjectivity."' 38 Appealing to the plain meaning supposedly inherent in the
constitutional and statutory documents, the originalists conveniently gloss over
the inconsistencies and ambiguities abounding in such texts. Breyer notes:
The more literal judges may hope to find in language, history, tradition, and prece-
dent objective interpretive standards; they may seek to avoid an interpretive subjec-
tivity that could confuse a judge's personal idea of what is good for that which the
Constitution demands; and they may believe that these more "original" sources will
more readily yield rules that can guide other institutions, including lower courts.
These objectives are desirable, but I do not think the literal approach will achieve
them, and, in any event, the constitutional price is too high.1
39
With his interpretive weapons drawn, Breyer proceeds to analyze several
key legislative acts that have come before the Supreme Court - campaign
finance reform, the disposal of toxic substances, federal minimum standards,
134 Id. at 114, 120.
131 Stephen Breyer, Our Democratic Constitution, The Fall 2001 James Madison Lecture at
New York University Law School (Oct. 22, 2001), at http://www.supremecourtus. gov/pub-







equal protection and voting rights, and laws infringing on privacy rights -
showing in each case how the decisions he recommended, some reflecting the
minority opinion, navigate between the equally sound yet conflicting objectives
propounded by the framers. Breyer's overriding concern in all these decisions
was to promote "the Constitution's general democratic participatory objectives
[which] can help courts deal more effectively with a range of specific constitu-
tional issues."
1 40
There is the story of a British official entrusted to hold court in India who
asks his more experienced colleague for advice. "Use your common sense,"
the esteemed judge tells him, "and you will almost always be right, but never
give reasons for your rulings, for they will almost always be wrong." That is,
pretty much, what radical pragmatists at law advise us to do. It is easier to see
what they oppose - originalism, textualism, formalism - than to grasp any
alternatives they put forward. Legal pragmatists reject originalism on the
ground that we could not possibly fathom the primordial constitutional under-
standing, not with fifty-five framers struggling to reach a compromise over the
Constitution and some 1500 delegates bitterly contesting its meaning at the
state ratifying conventions. Nor can we rely on the plain language of the final
document to yield its timeless meanings to honest textualists willing to set aside
their prejudices and let the Constitution speak for itself. Pragmatists are skepti-
cal about any doctrine that casts the judge as a faithful agent carrying out the
legislative will by applying formal rules while ignoring the ambiguities inher-
ent in legislative acts and conflicting special interests embodied in their provi-
sions. Pragmatist jurists see the judicial process as part of a national
conversation in which they take part as legal professionals entrusted to guard
the tradition and as citizens sensitive to evolving community standards. They
are eclectic in the choice of tools,14 ' ready to reach for whatever helps advance
the democratic process in a manner consistent with the framers' ideals. An
ethos more than a theory, pragmatism invites judges to cultivate an inquiring
mind, consult empirical research, and accept all conclusions as provisional in
the face of the semi-chaotic world we inhabit. Sometimes that means drawing
on "the ragtag bag of metaphors, analogies, rules of thumb, inspirational
phrases, incantations, and jerry-built 'reasons' that keep the conversation going
and bring it to temporary, and always revisable, conclusions." 142
One senses this pragmatic attitude in Justice Breyer's contention that laws
change "in the context of a national conversation involving, among others,
scientists, engineers, businessmen and women, the media, along with legisla-
tors, judges, and many ordinary citizens;"' 4 3 in his willingness to enlist rhetori-
cal devises like "metaphor [which helps] avoid the more rigid interpretations to
140 Id.
141 Special mention in this regard deserves Sunsteins's attempt to articulate "incompletely
theorized agreements," which can be seen as an alternative to the kind of extreme positions
we find in Stanley Fish (who favors "completely untheorized" decisions) and Justice Scalia
(who insists on "completely theorized" judgments). See Cass R. Sunstein, Agreement With-
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which greater reliance upon canons alone would lead;" and in his determination
to "harmonize a court's daily work of interpreting statutes with the Constitu-
tion's democratic, and liberty-protecting, objectives."' 44 As Breyer's analysis
suggests, there is more to the pragmatist method than blowing with the political
winds. Legal pragmatists need not dispense with principles or ditch theory
altogether, as Stanley Fish would have it. Principles have their rightful place in
the pragmatist analysis, provided we understand that they do not coalesce into
an immaculate logical system and often appear at loggerheads. Theory comes
in handy too, especially if it is open to nonclassical insights into the objective
indeterminacy of the situation. Dewey urged judges to adopt "a logic relative
to consequences rather than to antecedents, a logic of prediction of probabili-
ties rather than one of deduction of certainties," but he also maintained that "in
judicial decisions the only alternative to arbitrary dicta, accepted by the parties
to a controversy only because of the authority or prestige of the judge, is a
rational statement which formulates grounds and exposes connecting or logical
links."' 45 The search for pragmatically understood principles and a logic of
inquiry consistent with emergent determinism remains on the legal pragmatists'
research agenda.
VI. THE PLACE OF PRINCIPLES IN PRAGMATIC JURISPRUDENCE
Rightly or wrongly, weighing consequences is perceived as the chief
method of pragmatist adjudication that lets a cost-benefit analysis tip the scales
toward a particular holding. But do we not endorse the facts-speak-for-them-
selves positivism when we claim "[t]here are bad pragmatic decisions as well
as good ones" 14 6 without spelling out the accounting principles to guide the
evaluation? Zeroing in on legal outcomes and their long-term impact on soci-
ety poses serious challenges.
For one thing, the consequences a legal ruling is likely to engender are
often hard to fathom, and when they loom large, it is difficult to calculate their
true cost. Just try to balance the risk of plunging the country into a Presidential
succession crisis against the damage to the rule of law the Court's decision in
Bush v. Gore could have precipitated. Biases affecting decision calculus are
another difficult-to-gauge factor in high-wire balancing acts, like the one the
Supreme Court had to perform in Roe v. Wade. 147 According to Posner, the
Justices failed to reach a pragmatically viable decision in this crucial case.
When they overturned the Texas statute prohibiting abortion (except where a
woman's life is endangered), the Justices underestimated the moral outrage
their decision was likely to provoke in certain religious circles. Nor did the
Court weigh the positive impact on sexual habits that letting the Texas statute
stand could have had, such as "to make girls and women somewhat more care-
ful about sexual activity than if they still had access to abortion on demand as a
144 Id.
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backup to contraception .. 148 Above all, Posner contends, the Justices
failed to consider the "stifling effect on democratic experimentation of estab-
lishing a constitutional right to abortion." 149 It was wrong, in other words, to
stop a state from pursuing its own policy and finding out whether it works in
practice.
Posner does not dwell on the negative consequences that upholding the
Texas antiabortion statute could have produced - outrage among the pro-choice
activists, grim prospects of back alley abortions, the difficulty of monitoring
compliance with the Texas statute. Yet, the cost of such consequences was
hardly negligible, and weighing it against the cost of the decision the Court
handed down in Roe v. Wade would have been a contentious exercise without a
principle to anchor the holding. Whether it is an unconscious bias or an explic-
itly stated rationale, some sort of perspective is bound to guide the evaluation
process. Even Stanley Fish cannot avoid recourse to general principles when
he talks about "longstanding injustices" as a reason for pressing on with affirm-
ative action, 5 ' to say nothing of Orlando Patterson's appeal to "the supreme
virtue of being fair." ' ' And if we add up all the pragmatic consequences Pos-
ner cites in his opposition to Roe v. Wade, it would not seem outlandish to infer
that their combined effect dovetails with conservative principles.
Matching legal decisions with their consequences is indeed a hazardous
enterprise. Based on the "If X-then-Y" logic, such an exercise tends to run
afoul of the ceteris paribus clause, the assumption that other things are being
equal. Other factors are rarely equal in the real world, however, where events
cannot be readily broken down into logical antecedents and outcomes. Rather,
we are forced to deal with causal networks that produce wide-ranging, often
unanticipated consequences which leave ample room for partisan squabbling
about which outcome can be credited to what decision. It took time for econo-
mists to realize that unregulated markets produce monopolies inimical to free
trade and for social scientists to figure out that releasing the mentally ill from
hospitals turns prisons into mental wards. Reckoning with this perennial uncer-
tainty, pragmatists learned to mistrust broad theoretical claims, stick close to
particulars, and keep tracking the unanticipated consequences our informed
decisions routinely produce. Still, pragmatists are not ready to give up on prin-
ciples altogether.
Posner is well aware that pragmatic jurisprudence cannot confine itself to
weighing consequences, which is why he rejects crude consequentialism and
embraces a qualified consequentialism he credits to a genuinely pragmatic
approach, which is not above borrowing wisdom from any creed. In this spirit,
Posner adopts a not-that-I-am-against rhetorical strategy designed to prove
legal pragmatism's moderate bona fide. "It would not be unpragmatic to prefer
the rule to the standard," he writes. "Nor would it be unpragmatic to refuse to
148 See POSNER, LAW, supra note 96, at 125.
149 Id. Another pragmatist alternative available in this case, Posner suggests, was to invali-
date the Texas law but uphold a less stringent Georgia statute which allowed abortions in
cases involving rape and incest. Id. at 126.
150 See Fish, supra note 106, at A27.
151 See Patterson, supra note 111, at 11.
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recognize any but the most excruciatingly narrow exception to the rule."' 152
"Nor is it unpragmatic to worry ... about constitutional doctrines that are so
loose that they give judges carte blanche to decide cases any way they want
.... ,153 Moreover, "legal pragmatism is not always and everywhere the best
approach to law . . . in some circumstances formalism is the best pragmatic
strategy."' 54 There is no analytical arrow, it seems, which would not fit into
the pragmatist quiver. With the conceptual net spread so widely, legal
pragmatists make their claims sound more realistic, but such an ecumenist strat-
egy has its cost: it blurs the pragmatic jurist's identity, turns legal pragmatism
into a hodge-podge of ad hoc practices, and unwittingly refocuses attention on
the moral underpinnings of law. Posner shows little interest in juridical moral-
ism, resolutely rejecting Kant's "moralistic conception of law far removed from
pragmatic considerations."' 155 But scholars sympathetic to pragmatism's pro-
gressive agenda are willing to give the Kantian perspective on human auton-
omy another chance.
The natural law tradition from which Kant derived his inspiration had fur-
nished a theoretical groundwork for modem republicanism. The inalienable
rights verbiage helped safeguard human autonomy against absolutism, and as
such, it aided the movement toward civil society which gave citizens the liber-
ties necessary to advance their private goals with minimum state interference.
Natural law shored up capitalist markets, providing the bourgeoisie with the
enforceable legal constructs to support their entrepreneurial ventures. Unfet-
tered commerce, industrial buildup protected from state interference, labor free
to sell itself in the marketplace, freedom to enter contractual relations anywhere
in the nation - such laissez-faire principles inscribed into law did their magic
with little public outcry well into the nineteenth century, when the harsh reali-
ties of unbridled capitalism began to ignite a serious opposition. As capitalism
went through its natural cycles of multiplying goods and profits, it also left in
its wake a trail of human misery which the custodians of law were no more
eager to acknowledge than the captains of industry. The U.S. Supreme Court
steadfastly invoked the freedom of contract to rebuff legislative efforts to
soften the impact of round-the-clock manufacturing on children and women
while citing the same natural law to keep women from entering the legal pro-
fession as inimical to "the nature of things" and the "functions of womanhood"
which mercifully consigned women to "the domestic sphere." 156 Meanwhile,
free competition bred fierce battles for the markets, and free markets begot
cartels and trusts, whose monopolistic proclivities encouraged price fixing and
pushed upward the cost of living, most ominously for labor, whose deteriorat-
ing working conditions stirred serious unrest at the century's end. The cause of
human dignity that liberalism took for its guiding star was hard to reconcile
with children working overtime on the factory floor and in shops throughout
152 See POSNER, LAW, supra note 96, at 339.
153 Id. at 374.
154 Id. at 94.
155 Id. at 251.
156 Bradwell v. Illinois, 83 U.S. 130, 141-42 (1872) (Bradley, J., concurring); see also
Daniel R. Oritz, Deadlock in Constitutional Theory, in PRAGMATISM IN LAW AND SOCIETY,
supra note 8, at 314.
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the country. Such was the fate of the "18th century doctrine of natural rights,"
Dewey charged, "which began as a liberal doctrine and is now the dogma of
reactionaries." 157 Child labor legislation, the federal workmen's compensation
program, the Adamson Act reducing working hours on interstate railroads,
Sherman antitrust regulations, food and drug laws - every statute passed during
the Progressive era was at some point challenged in court as inimical to consti-
tutional principles or stalled by legislators eager to please special interests. It
was up to Holmes, Cardozo, and other juridical mavericks to nudge the Consti-
tutions in a new direction to meet public concerns. At first decried as lapsus
judicii, their unconventional opinions would in time become mainstream.
Not that the rights natural law bestowed upon humans ceased to be valued.
What happened was that the routine interpretation and enforcement of these
rights produced consequences the American public came to judge injurious to
its other rights. And that, I believe, is the point legal pragmatists like Holmes
and Cardozo (and more recently Breyer) were trying to make in their defense of
the consequence-oriented yet constitutionally grounded legal reasoning. The
need for such jurisprudence becomes clear at major historical junctions. That is
when new principles are invoked to offset old ones and fresh metaphors
deployed to fire up moral imagination and spur legal creativity. It is at such a
turning point in our legal history that pragmatic jurisprudence first came into its
own.
This momentous historical transformation exemplifies the pragmatist
notion of emergent determinism which, we may recall, suggests that our princi-
ples do not merely describe the world out there but also help usher it in, lend it
determinacy. "Indeterminacy" does not mean the paucity of terms as much as
their overabundance, with antithetical terminologies vying for attention and
forcing themselves on the public mind. While the social world appears to its
producers as a thing itself, it owes its being to terminological practices - and
law is a paradigmatic example of a formal terminological practice - through
which historical agents continuously frame themselves and their situations as
meaningful objects. Applied and enforced, a principle brings in tow an objec-
tive reality which appears to stand on its own, blinding its producers to the
constitutive role their sense-bestowing interpretation and law-abiding action
play in generating the world as a sheer fact. What humans discover at major
historical junctions is that this facticity is a historical accomplishment, that as
sense-making creatures we all take part in the production of social reality as
objective and meaningful. We do so by applying the taken-for-granted values,
principles, laws - the terminological means of production that generate the
world as a readily recognizable, affectively saturated, behaviorally fleshed out
historical construct. Such terminological props do not form a coherent system,
although contradictions enciphered in the text remain hidden for the time being.
Meanwhile, these contradictions do their subterranean work, as principles
bump up against each other, with some forced into plain view, others pushed
down, and new ones working their way into public discourse.
A good example of constitutional principles working at cross purpose is
the slogans the French Revolution proudly placed on its masthead - liberte,
157 DEWEY, supra note 145, at 234.
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egalit, fraterniti. Far from being mutually reinforcing, these principles subtly
undermined each other. Civil liberties that allowed citizens to pursue their pri-
vate interests without state interference did little to mitigate inequality. The
material inequalities, in turn, handicapped the ability of the poor to redeem
their constitutional rights and, in the absence of a meaningful safety net,
dimmed prospects for social peace. Taking a clue from Isaiah Berlin we can
say that by maximizing one value we are likely to undermine some other value,
by doing justice to one right we may have to abridge another. The relationship
between the antithetically paired principles is that of uncertainty - the two can-
not be maximized simultaneously with an arbitrary precision. Clean environ-
ment, we all agree, is a good thing, but so is chip oil and energy self-
sufficiency, and it is not until the issue of oil drilling in Alaska comes up that
we are forced to judge which value must in the end trump the other. By the
same token, we all value liberty and equality, yet pushing one principle to its
limit will inevitably set it on a collision course with the other. And when prin-
ciples we act upon bring forth conflicting realities, we cannot readily appeal to
"facts" to resolve the tension between valued objectives, for these facts are
propped up by the very principles we espouse. To deal with social strain, we
must engage in a moral discourse about the first principles, their relative
weight, and the kind of society they' engender.
Herein lies the significance of the Kantian distinction between adjudica-
tion and justification, between positive law that treats reality as a fact deter-
mined in itself and moral law that lends to things themselves their humane
significance. Both types of law rely on force to achieve their goals. In one
case this is the administrative force that secures compliance through violence;
in the other - the force of reason which appeals to nothing but our moral imagi-
nation or compassion with fellow human beings. Eclipsed by the utilitarian and
pragmatic philosophies, this Kantian perspective has made a comeback. It
shines through in contemporary thinkers like Ronald Dworkin who calls for
"the moral reading of the Constitution;" '15 8 it is evident in John Rawls's com-
mitment to "Kant's [and] Rousseau's idea that liberty is acting in accordance
with a law that we give to ourselves;" '159 and it is most palpable in Jirgen
Habermas who "demands a remoralization of politics"' 1 60 and grounds his the-
ory in the "principle, that - expressed in the Kantian manner - only reason
should have force." 16 1 These authors seek to restore the debate about princi-
ples to its rightful place in jurisprudence, as well as widen public discourse on
the meaning of justice. Each one uses a different strategy for reintegrating
moral deliberation into the legal process.
158 See RONALD DWORKIN, FREEDOM'S LAW: THE MORAL READING OF THE AMERICAN
CONSTITUTION 72-76 (1996) (describing the idea of a natural reading of the Constitution).
159 JOHN RAWLS, THEORY OF JUSTICE 225 (1999).
160 JORGEN HABERMAS, AUTONOMY AND SOLIDARITY: INTERVIEWS WITH JORGEN HABERMAS
71 (Peter Dews ed., 1986).
161 JORGEN HABERMAS, TOWARD A RATIONAL SOCIETY; STUDENT PROTEST, SCIENCE, AND
POLITICS 7 (Jeremy I. Shapiro trans.,1970).
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VII. JURIDICAL MORALISM RECONSIDERED
In his influential monograph, Law's Empire, Dworkin outlines three com-
peting perspectives on law - legal positivism, legal pragmatism, and what he
calls "law as integrity. "162 Legal positivism has several strains, all converging
on the premise that in any historical community there is one correct statement
as to what the law is or what it requires, and it is up to jurists to discover and
apply this correct reading to the case at bar. Legal positivists do not agonize
about the law's ambiguities or the need to reconcile statutes with nascent
mores. They simply follow the "plain-fact view of law" and enforce statutes in
line with established conventions, relevant precedent, and the brute facts of the
case. 16 3 Legal pragmatism, by comparison, is "a skeptical conception of law"
premised on the notion that judges "should make whatever decisions seem to
them best for the community's future, not counting any form of consistency
with the past as valuable for its own sake." 164 The principle of right does not
play a prominent role in this legal approach. Its proponents treat civil liberties
as legal fictions filled with specific meaning by the judges who "sometimes act
as if people had legal rights" but who are generally free to invoke or ignore any
principle as the situation warrants, consistent with the overall objective of fur-
thering social change. 165 This perspective, according to Dworkin, ignores the
systemic properties of law, the paramount objective of reconstructing the legal
corpus as a coherent system aimed to (a) produce predictable outcomes; (b)
clarify the overall constitutional architecture; and (c) regenerate the nation's
liberal culture. Such is the burden of the third legal perspective Dworkin calls
"law as integrity which accepts law and legal rights wholeheartedly,"
1 66
"demands consistency with decisions already made by other judges and legisla-
ture,"' 67 and claims that "law's constraints benefit society not just by providing
predictability or procedural fairness, or in some other instrumental way, but by
securing a kind of equality among citizens that makes their community more
genuine and improves its moral justification for exercising the political power it
does."
168
In his subsequent works, Dworkin grounds law as integrity in liberal val-
ues and principles he finds central to the U.S. Constitution. Chief among these
is the "general principle that the government should not act out of prejudice
against any group of citizens."' 16 9 Doing so would violate human dignity and
moral autonomy - values consistent with "the ideal of ethical individualism
' 170
that Dworkin finds at the core of the U.S. Constitution interpreted in moral
terms. With this move, Dworkin hopes to avoid the pitfalls of originalism,
notably its proponents' reluctance to extend the reach of a constitutional princi-
ple beyond the matters it was meant to address by those who framed the princi-
162 DWORKIN, supra note 10, at 94.
163 Id. at 33; see also id. at 37-43.
164 Id. at 95.
165 Id. at 152.
166 Id. at 95.
167 Id.
168 Id. at 95-96.
169 See DWORKIN, supra note 158, at 271.
170 Id. at 250.
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pie. The fact that the Fourteenth Amendment aimed to remedy racial injustice
and said nothing about gender discrimination should not handicap future gener-
ations from mobilizing the moral force built into this principle for a fight
against the prejudicial, unequal treatment of women. The very abstract nature
of moral principles codified in the Constitution serves as an interpretive
resource, for "once we have defined the principle we attribute to the framers in
the more abstract way, we must treat their views about women as misunder-
standings of the force of their own principle, which time has given us the vision
to correct, just as we treat their views about racially segregated education. '1 7 '
The adjudication process, then, focuses on the structure of constitutional princi-
ples, with the expectation that judges will justify every decision by explicitly
anchoring it in a suitable moral principle and applying the same moral standard
consistently to the full range of relevant cases.1
7 2
John Rawls takes a different route toward restoring the moral dimension
of law. He enlists Kant's categorical imperative, the principle that bids us to
contemplate the maxim guiding our conduct as if it were a universal law and
measure our own conduct by what we are willing to tolerate in others. Apply-
ing this principle to law in his monumental treatise Theory of Justice, Rawls
develops "a justice as fairness" thesis that invites adjudicators to place them-
selves in "the original position" or a purely deliberative state where one can
"set up a fair procedure so that any principles agreed to will be just. ' 17 3 The
justification discourse succeeds when "the parties are situated behind the veil of
ignorance," i.e., when they "do not know how the various alternatives will
affect their own particular case [and] are obliged to evaluate principles solely
on the basis of general considerations."1 74 Under such idealized conditions of
unconstrained discourse propelled by arguments alone, participants are
expected to establish a hierarchy of universal rights reasonable enough to
secure consent from the parties involved and to insure distributive justice.
Legal practice will be guided here not just by positive laws but by the adjudica-
tors' sense of justice, the fair standards articulated in the ongoing national dis-
course about moral goods and the way these goods ought to be distributed
among community members.
The strategy Rawls favors in implementing the justification process is dif-
ferent from the one advocated by Dworkin. The latter recognizes that discourse
on justice is part of a broader democratic process, but he addresses his model
primarily to legal professionals whom he expects to shoulder the main burden
of upholding fairness in the community: "[I]ndividual citizens can in fact exer-
cise the moral responsibilities of citizenship better when final decisions involv-
ing constitutional values are removed from ordinary politics and assigned to
courts, whose decisions are meant to turn on principle, not on the weight of
numbers or the balance of political influence."175 Rawls, on the other hand,
wants to draw into justification discourse a far broader constituency. Lawyers
are not accorded a privileged role in his schema, nor are philosophers, who may
171 DWORKIN, supra note 158, at 270.
172 See id. at 271.
173 RAWLS, supra note 159, at 118.
174 Id.
175 See DWORKIN, supra note 158, at 344.
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initiate the discussion but who otherwise play no special part in this process
which includes legislators, executives, judges, party leaders, and citizens
engaged in a discourse about public good and rational principles: "In justice as
fairness there are no philosophical experts. Heaven forbid! But citizens must,
after all, have some ideas of right and justice in their thought and some basis
for their reasoning. And students of philosophy take part in formulating these
ideas but always as citizens among others."
17 6
Habermas is even more adamant about the importance of engaging the
entire body politic in justification discourse. Combining Kant's commitment to
a disinterested moral deliberation where everybody has a vote with Peirce's
vision of a research community ceaselessly advancing toward truth, Habermas
calls for a public discourse in an ideal speech situation found "under the prag-
matic conditions of rational discourses in which the only thing that counts is
the compelling force of the better argument based on the relevant informa-
tion." 177 "In this speech situation, persons for and against a problematic valid-
ity claim thematize the claim, and, relieved of the pressures of action and
experience, adopt a hypothetical attitude in order to test with reasons, and rea-
sons alone, whether the proponent's claim stands up.' 78 Habermas does not
offer a comprehensive account of the conditions under which the justification
discourse achieves its goals, but drawing on his various works we can say that
ideal speech conditions exist in a situation where: (1) every interested party
has a say; (2) no force is admitted except the force of reason; (3) all statements
are sorted out into factual, normative, and expressive validity claims; (4) pro-
positions are methodically redeemed through rational arguments; (5) the dis-
cussion continues until a collective consensus is reached; and (6) conclusions
are revised in light of experience and further deliberation. 179
The ideal speech situation can be approximated only in a thoroughly mod-
em society which has replaced "the weight of tradition with the weight of argu-
ments .... "180 A society that clears this threshold no longer accepts positive
law in its unexamined facticity, as a natural state enforced by administrative
power, but demands judgment about the law's legitimacy based on rational
considerations. That is when the perennial "tension between facticity and
validity built into law itself, between the positivity of law and the legitimacy
claimed by it"' 1 comes to the fore. For centuries this tension has been build-
ing in the Occidental world, which saw European states undergo the juridifica-
tion process. Following Max Weber and Otto Kirchheimer, Habermas
176 JOHN RAWLS, POLITICAL LIBERALISM 427 (1995).
177 HABERMAS, supra note 13, at 103.
178 Id. at 228.
179 See JORGEN HABERMAS, AUTONOMY AND SOLIDARITY: INTERVIEWS WITH JURGEN
HABERMAS 90 (Peter Dews ed., 1986); see also 2 JORGEN HABERMAS, THE THEORY OF COM-
MUNICATIVE ACTION 72-74 (Thomas McCarthy trans., 1987) [hereinafter HABERMAS, THE-
ORY]; Dmitri N. Shalin, Critical Theory and the Pragmatist Challenge, 98 AM. J. Soc. 237
(1992) (discussing Habermas's theory of communicative action and the ideal speech situa-
tion); Habermas, Pragmatism, and Critical Theory, in 15 Symbolic Interaction 1 (Dmitri N.
Shalin ed., 1992).
180 JORGEN HABERMAS, COMMUNICATION AND EVOLUTION OF SOCIETY 113 (Thomas
McCarthy trans., 1979).
181 See HABERMAS, supra note 13, at 95.
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identifies this process with "the tendency toward an increase in formal (or posi-
tive, written) law that can be observed in modem society."18  The juridifica-
tion has unfolded in stages, beginning with the creation of a centralized state
under Absolutism, followed by a constitutional monarchy, in turn supplanted
by a democratic constitutional state, which evolved into a contemporary demo-
cratic welfare state.
The juridification process has produced mixed results. On one hand, it
codified civil rights (protecting individuals from arbitrary state interference),
political rights (securing citizens' ability to participate in the political process),
and social rights (spreading the safety net underneath the most vulnerable
social strata). On the other hand, by extending law into life domains previously
immune to legal rational authority, the juridification process has weakened the
bond between the lifeworld and the normative system, between personal values
and impersonal regulations, between individual identities and bureaucratic
rationalized classifications. To offset the insidious consequences of juridifica-
tion and bureaucratization, one has to find ways to reengage alienated citizenry
in justification discourse about the laws' rationality. According to Habermas,
"the legitimacy of law ultimately depends on a communicative arrangement: as
participants in rational discourses, consociates under law must be able to
examine whether a contested norm meets with, or could meet with, the agree-
ment of all those possibly affected." '183 To be sure, communicative practices
are unlikely to render positive law and administrative force completely obsolete
- in modern society with its staggering complexity, "the increasing need for
integration must hopelessly overtax the integrating capacity of communicative
action." '184 But the justification discourse conducted under the conditions
approximating ideal speech empowers the subjects of law, particularly those
dependent on the largesse distributed by the welfare administration, and thus
promises to lend legitimacy to the thoroughly bureaucratized, impervious-to-
scrutiny legal system. In a democratic state, "the legitimacy of statutes is mea-
sured against the discursive redeemability of their normative validity claims -
in the final analysis, according to whether they have come about through a
rational legislative process, or at least could have been justified from prag-
matic, ethical, and moral points of view."1 85
Contemporary juridical moralism deplores the situation where "the court
serves as nothing more than an ad hoc arbiter of issues it finds too difficult to
decide in a principled way." '86 At the same time, legal moralism moves
beyond Kant's moral apriorism. It shows how moral principles can undergo
historical reinterpretation without losing their universal appeal. It suggests
standards by which one can assess the practical consequences of various legal
decisions. It integrates the legal process into a community-wide justification
182 See HABERMAS, THEORY, supra note 179, at 357.
183 HABERMAS, supra note 13, at 104.
184 Id. at 26.
'85 Id. at 30.
186 Charles Fried, Courting Confusion, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 21, 2004, at A29. Fried takes to
task the present-day Supreme court for "defending principles in theory but abandoning them
in fact, [which] points to a court that has lost its will to protect and explain the nuanced
doctrinal constructions that have threaded their way past opposing extremes." Id.
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discourse where citizens as well as institutional agents take part. And it cap-
tures certain features of justification discourse in our legal and political com-
munity. As far back as the 1858 Lincoln-Douglas debates, the discussion about
the most urgent legal issues confronting the nation featured a clash of moral
principles. Judge Stephen Douglas articulated one such principle when he
appealed to "popular sovereignty'" 1 7 as a constitutional warrant allowing citi-
zens of each state to decide whether they wish to retain the institution of slav-
ery. 88 Abraham Lincoln offered an alternative moral vision, one based on the
hermeneutical strategy highlighting "the abstract moral question"' 189 that the
Declaration of Independence raised and that required new answers from succes-
sive generations:
I think the authors of that notable instrument intended to include all men, but they did
not intend to declare all men equal in all respects. They did not mean to say that all
men were equal in color, size, intellect, moral development, or social capacity. They
defined with tolerable distinctness in what respects they did consider all men created
equal - equal in certain inalienable rights, among which are life, liberty, and the
pursuit of happiness. This they said, and this they meant. They did not mean to
assert the obvious untruth, that all were then actually enjoying that equality, nor yet
that they were about to confer it immediately upon them. In fact, they had no power
to confer such a boon. They meant simply to declare the right, so that the enforce-
ment of it might follow as fast as circumstances should permit. They meant to set up
a standard maxim for free society which should be familiar to all and revered by all -
constantly looked to, constantly labored for, and even, though never perfectly
attained, constantly approximated; and thereby constantly spreading and deepening
its influence and augmenting the happiness and value of life to all people, of all
colors, everywhere.
1 9 0
This is as good an approximation of the law-as-integrity model as you can
find in U.S. political history. But as the above example suggests, juridical mor-
alism runs into problems of its own. After all, it was not the force of reason
that allowed Lincoln to impose his moral vision on this reluctant nation. It was
the Civil War which required the suspension of habeas corpus, interdiction of
enemy food supplies, burning of Atlanta to the ground, and the sacrifice of
more than half a million lives. The fight for moral principles can be costly.
The moral reading of the Constitution raises the question how to balance
moral precepts vying for supremacy at any given historical junction. Dworkin
is fully aware that ethical principles enciphered in our Constitution routinely
clash, that they send mixed signals to interpreters facing specific legal
problems. Where one adjudicator favors human autonomy, another may stress
equal opportunity, and still others opt for security, safety, or social justice as a
moral guide. The ethics of conviction and the morality of ultimate ends breed
187 Fifth Joint Debate, at Galesburgh, Illinois, (Oct. 7, 1858), in 1 ABRAHAM LINCOLN, THE
COMPLETE WORKS OF ABRAHAM LINCOLN 427-28 (John G. Nicolay & John Hay eds., The
Century Co. 1894). Countering Lincoln, Douglas plausibly claimed that "this government
was made by our fathers on the white basis. It was made by white men for the benefit of
white men and their posterity forever, and was intended to be administered by white men in
all time to come." Id. at 434.
188 Id. at 435.
189 Id. at 438.
190 Speech in Springfield, Illinois (June 26, 1857), in LINCOLN, supra note 187, at 226, 232.
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bitter disagreements, especially when we deal with hot-button issues like repro-
ductive rights, gay marriage, and sexually explicit materials. Sometimes these
moral disagreements evolve into full-blown uncivil wars. The bitter polemics
between Dworkin and MacKinnon, one taking liberty as a paramount value and
another placing social justice above individual autonomy, is the case in
point.191 It would be hard to avoid self-righteousness and acrimony in ethics-
centered judicial discourse without a meta-discourse justifying a hierarchy of
moral principles and settling conflicts between competing value claims. Or
else, we need to make ample room for the honest difference of opinion in situa-
tions where consensus about moral priorities proves elusive.
Another objection to current efforts to remoralize legal practice concerns
the division of powers in our political system which explicitly empowers legis-
lators to deliberate on the moral questions. According to the tripartite system
of government, the judges' responsibility is to make sure that the legislative
will, provided it comports with basic constitutional requirements, is correctly
interpreted and properly executed. That is what Justice Scalia advocates in his
textualist approach to adjudication. Once the legislature passes the law, judges
must squelch their personal preferences and exercise judicial restraint, applying
unswervingly the moral guidelines spelled out by the Congress. But as Scalia's
critics are quick to point out,192 he did not live up to his commitment when he
joined the majority decision in Bush v Gore that contradicted the Court's and
Scalia's longstanding deference to states' rights in matters within their jurisdic-
tion, which state election procedures clearly exemplified. For all their dedica-
tion to the rule of law, originalists cannot evade their biases in situations
marked by indeterminacy. Indeed, textualists never cease to be community
members, and their legal judgments are bound to reflect, albeit in a well dis-
guised form, their sense of what is fair and just for their own time and place.
One can also object to the moral reasoning in law on the ground that its
proponents privilege consensus over dissent. Habermas cites Giinther Franken-
berg to the effect that justice as fairness underestimates the fact that "law is not
a rule system but chaos" marred by "the radical indeterminacy" which pre-
cludes a rational consensus about "equal treatment and justice."' 93 But this
criticism applies to Habermas even more so than to Dworkin, who has to con-
tend with the problem of consensus building among a handful of appellate
judges (or just one "judge-Hercules"), whereas Habermas anticipates a commu-
nity-wide agreement as the ultimate test for the rationality of a particular legal
opinion or policy decision. Habermas does not sound very pragmatic when he
contends that "majority decisions are held to be only a substitute for the
uncompelled consensus that would finally result if discussion did not always
191 See generally DWORKIN supra note 158, at 195-243.
192 Alan Dershowitz points out that Scalia's vote in Bush v Gore contradicts his own pro-
nouncement that "[o]nly by announcing rules do we hedge ourselves in" and that whenever
"my political or policy preferences regarding the outcomes are quite opposite, I will be
unable to indulge those preferences; I have committed myself to the governing principle."
Antonin Scalia, The Rule of Law as a Law of Rules, 56 U. CHI. L. REv. 1175, 1179-80
(1989), quoted in ALAN DERSHOWITZ, SUPREME INJUSTICE: How THE HIGH COURT HIJACKED
ELECTION 2000, at 123-24 (2001).
193 Gunther Frankenberg, Down by Law: Irony, Seriousness, and Reason, 83 Nw. U. L.
Rev. 360, 392-93 (1988), quoted in HABERMAS, supra note 13, at 216.
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have to be broken off owing to the need for a decision." 19 4 And he is theoreti-
cally vulnerable when he holds rational consensus rather than reasonable dis-
sent to be the touchstone of democratic politics. Certain locutions which crop
up in his texts - "the costs of dissensions are quite high," "the risk of dissen-
sion is growing," "[one has to] counter the risk of dissension and therewith the
risk of instability built into the communicative mode of social reproduction in
general"' 195 - makes one wonder if dissent has any conceptual footing in his
theory as a vital element in the judicial and democratic process.
Finally, the contemporary juridical moralists like Habermas and Rawls
remain faithful to the Kantian program that bypasses emotions and frames
every dispute as a "lawsuit. ' ' 196 Fashioned on the anvil of rationalism, the ideal
speech situation appears to be thoroughly emptied of its affective content.
Emotion shows up in the theory of communicative action in a truncated form as
the "sincerity of the expressions' 1 97 and in the justice-as-fairness paradigm as
the "principle-dependent and conception-dependent desires."'1 98 But theories
that "attribute to reasons the force to 'move' participants, in a nonpsychological
sense"'199 run the risk of reducing moral agents engaged in the justification
process to talking heads - disembodied creatures listening only to the voice of
reason and ordering themselves into action by the sheer power of their will.
References to "motivation through 'good reasons' ,,2 beg the question as to
where theory-driven desires come from and how they mesh with more mun-
dane motives and partisan interests. Perhaps realizing this, Habermas amends
his wording in the postscript to his treatise on law, which contains several tan-
talizing references to the habits of freedom and a population schooled in
liberty:
[Clonstitutional democracy depends on the motivations of a population accustomed
to liberty, motivations that cannot be generated by administrative measures .... 201
[Flor only a population accustomed to freedom can keep the institutions of freedom
alive .... 202 [Clonstitutionally protected institutions of freedom are worth only what
a population accustomed to political freedom and settled in the "we" perspective of
active self-determination makes of them.
2 0 3
Italicized in the original, the word "accustomed" tacitly grounds commu-
nicative action in the nondiscursive properties deliberating agents are expected
to bring to justification discourse. Communicative practices embedded in dem-
ocratic deliberation are to be carried out by the agents whose embodied habits
have already met the demands of the democratic process. This circular, unthe-
orized premise exposes the Achilles heel of the deontological tradition in moral
194 JORGEN HABERMAS, TOWARD A RATIONAL SOCIETY: STUDENT PROTEST, SCIENCE, AND
POLITICS 7 (Jeremy J. Shapiro trans., 1970).
195 See HABERMAS, supra note 13, at 21, 26, 36.
196 KANT, supra note 17, at 486.
197 1 JURGEN HABERMAS, THE THEORY OF COMMUNICATIVE ACTION 41 (Thomas McCarthy
trans., 1984).
'98 RAWLS, supra note 176, at 85.
199 HABERMAS, supra note 13, at 227.
200 HABERMAS, supra note 180, at 200.
201 Id. at 461.
202 Id. at 513.
203 Id. at 499.
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philosophy and the theory of democratic justice that takes its cue from ethical
formalism.
VIII. THE FULLY EMBODIED DEMOCRATIC PROCESS
The deontological tradition in ethics stipulates that duty trumps inclination
whenever the two are in conflict. 204 Kant, the radical exponent of this view,
would have us believe that only by suppressing passions and cultivating "moral
apathy" or complete "freedom from agitation ' 2°5 can we have confidence in
the verdict rendered by "the court of justice of morality."20 6 The moral philos-
ophy privileging reason over emotions has its counterpart in ethical emotivism
whose proponents mistrust reason's propensity to rationalize and seek to check
its intellectual proclivities by "moral sense," "moral sentiments," "the senti-
ment of the heart," and kindred forms of affective reasonableness "upon which
each particular virtue is found. '2 °7 David Hume, with whom Kant carries a
tacit polemics, captured the antirationalist pathos of this approach: "'Tis not
contrary to reason to prefer the destruction of the whole world to the scratching
of my finger. ''2°8 Pushing ethical emotivism to its logical extreme, Hume
stands the deontological maxim on its head: "Reason is, and ought only to be
the slave of the passions, and can never pretend to any other office than to
serve and obey them.' '2 ' The point is that our sentiments, desires, and pas-
sions must be of the kind that make for social peace and justice - reason alone
will not suffice.
Thus, deontological ethics and ethical emotivism are set on a collision
course. Whereas Kant etherealizes human agency into pure reason to achieve a
worthy moral aim, Hume and Adam Smith call on natural sentiments to resist
imperious reason's self-aggrandizing claim to pursue nothing but the public
good. Hume's polemical stance downplays the emotional littering that befouls
discourse, but then he readily admits passion's destructive potential when he
deals with anger or envy. Neither can Kant escape the recalcitrant reality of
strong affect, which worms itself back into his ethical rigorism disguised as
moral agent's passion for justice. And yet the two perspectives owe each other
more than their proponents are willing to admit. Incompatible at first blush,
both ethical systems are dialectically bound to each other. This dialectic comes
to the fore in the pragmatist view of reason as an embodied, historically emer-
gent, biosocial structure that channels emotions along intelligent pathways and
simultaneously taps affect's sensitivity to the indeterminacy of the situation.
That passions can disrupt human intercourse is obvious, and Kant makes a
sensible point when he appeals to judicious temperament. However, it is his
unwillingness to accommodate strong emotions that raises the red flags. As
Dewey warned us:
204 See Robert D. Olson, Deontological Ethics, in 2 ENCYCLOPEDIA OF PHILOSOPHY 343
(1967).
205 See KANT, supra note 26, at 70.
206 See KANT, supra note 40, at 213.
207 ADAM SMITH, THE THEORY OF MORAL SENTIMENTS 508, 511, 518 (Arlington House
1969) (1853).
208 DAVID HUME, A TREATISE OF HUMAN NATURE 416 (Prometheus Books 1992).
209 id. at 415.
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[T]he conclusion is not that the emotional, passionate phase of action can be or
should be eliminated in behalf of a bloodless reason. More 'passions,' not fewer, is
the answer .... Rationality, once more, is not a force to evoke against impulse and
habit. It is the attainment of a working harmony among diverse desires.
2 10
There is more to reason than intellect and analytical skills which help us
simplify reality, impose a rational schema on the world, and gloss over its
untamed and chaotic properties. The human mind also thrives on "emotional
intelligence ' 21' - an enlightened affect that readily transgresses borderlines
imposed by reason, reclaims the world's unfathomable complexity, and treats
uncertainty not as an indicator of our limited knowledge but as a birthmark of
the world-in-the-making, the world in which embodied human agents act as
participant observers. Extreme rationalism, in this reckoning, is a mark of self-
deception. A desire to suppress the somatic-affective dimension of human
existence is the sign of a troubled mind. Behind "the craving for rationality"
hides what James calls "the sentiment of rationality," a passionate desire to
make "the concrete chaos rational" and "banish puzzle from the universe"
which serves as a kind of analgesic promising to alleviate "a very intense feel-
ing of distress" and bring about the "peace of rationality. 21 2 The life of the
man who took the categorical imperative for his North Star offers an instructive
illustration to this pragmatist insight.
The moral heights Kant sought to scale were lofty indeed. He demanded
that we treat human beings as ends in themselves, cultivate a judicial temper in
interpersonal communications, and squelch malignant passions defiling our
moral agency. According to his contemporaries, Kant did not always follow
his own counsel. Curled under the thick layer of rationalism was a man "pas-
sionate and impulsive - both in the way in which he lived his life and the way
in which he philosophized. '21 3 The theoretician of categorical imperative
called upon his fellow citizens to foreswear treating others as means, yet he
leaned heavily on his reluctant ex-students to confront his critics and write
"apologia" for his controversial theories. 214 An eager conversationalist, Kant
liked talking better than listening, acted in an increasingly overbearing fashion
as his fame spread, and on occasion behaved "almost rudely and uncivilly"
toward those who disagreed with him.2 15 We will never know for sure whether
Kant managed to free himself from the pernicious habits which "give our imag-
ination free play in sensual pleasures," breed "vices.. . contrary to nature," and
precipitate "most serious offenses against the duties we owe to ourselves, 2 16
but it wouldn't be unreasonable to conjecture that he hadn't an easy time rid-
ding himself from carnal images through the superior power of his rational will.
Once again, we are reminded of Dewey's pragmatist warning:
210 DEWEY, supra note 62, at 195-96.
211 See DANIEL GOLEMAN, EMOTIONAL INTELLIGENCE (1995); HOWARD GARDNER, MULTI-
PLE INTELLIGENCES: THE THEORY IN PRACTICE (1993); RoB BOCCHINO, EMOTIONAL LITER-
ACY: To BE A DIFFERENT KIND OF SMART (1999).
212 See WILLIAM JAMES, THE WILL To BELIEVE: AND OTHER ESSAYS IN POPULAR PHILOSO-
PHY 63-75 (1956).
213 MANFRED KUEHN, KANT: A BIOGRAPHY 319 (2001).
214 See id. at 320-22.
215 See id. at 319.
216 See KANT, supra note 40, at 142.
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Men who devote themselves to thinking are likely to be unusually unthinking in
some respects, as for example in immediate personal relationships. A man to whom
exact scholarship is an absorbing pursuit may be more than ordinarily vague in ordi-
nary matters. Humility and impartiality may be shown in a specialized field, and
pettiness and arrogance in dealing with other persons.
217
Prudence requires that we exercise an abundance of caution sorting
through the testimonies left by Kant's contemporaries. A balanced biocritical
account has to include conflicting testimonies and avoid rash generalizations.
Bear in mind, also, that what is at issue here is not the truth of Kant's theory
prescribing a moral attitude but the extent to which the author of categorical
imperative integrated his theoretic stance with his pragmatic existence. We
need to undertake this inquiry to find out how much fiber there is in Kant's
morality. Looking from this angle at the discourse theory of law and the ideal
of a morally grounded democracy, one can see what it sorely misses - embod-
ied reasonableness. There is more to democracy than redeeming discursive
claims by rational arguments. Democracy is also a demeanor, a system of gov-
emnment sustained by citizens who sign themselves in the flesh as well as in
well-formed propositions. The same applies to law as an embodied practice
that thrives on the corporeal habits not always abounding in its most successful
practitioners. The moral approach to adjudication must extend beyond theoreti-
cal integrity to encompass an emotional stance that embodies the ethical princi-
ples the adjudicator bids us to accept.
Dworkin is right to protest MacKinnon's attacks on his moral commit-
ments and intellectual integrity,218 yet he needs to be careful to treat his oppo-
nents with the dignity he expects for himself. Suspect are the motives of those
who commit themselves to a truth and then take "dissent from that truth [a]s
treason," but those who bristle at dissenting views as an evidence of opponent's
stupidity and urge that disagreeable arguments be "discredited by the disgust,
outrage, and ridicule" '19 risk falling into the same trap. Considering how
Dworkin sometimes puts down his opponents, one is compelled to ask if he has
not crossed the line separating principled exchange from name calling.
According to the student of law as integrity, Posner is "relentlessly superfi-
cial."22 Rorty's followers pretend to be "busy while actually doing noth-
ing." 2 11 MacKinnon deploys "bad arguments," engages in "plain non sequitur,"
and reveals a "single-minded concentration on lurid sex." '22 Bork is a "crude
moral skeptic" given to "empty" rhetoric, advancing "meager" and "shabby"
ideas of "unsurpassed ugliness" and entertaining bogus arguments the way
"alchemists once used phlogiston."2 23 Again, I am not concerned with the sub-
stance of Dworkin's judgment, which has merit, only with the emotional atti-
tude his polemical stance embodies. It would be unfortunate if "vicious
conservatism," if there is such thing, springs a counterpart on the liberal side.
217 DEWEY, supra note 70, at 198.
218 See DWORKIN, supra note 158, 227-243.
219 Id. at 238, 252.
220 See Dworkin, supra note 11, at 377 n. 17.
221 Id. at 359.
222 DWORKIN, supra note 158, at 233, 243.
223 Id. at 273-75.
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Just think about First Amendment lawyers eloquently defending free
speech while repeatedly cutting off their opponents arguing the limits of free
expression. Performative contradictions of this kind abound among legal pro-
fessionals who may extol judicious temperament in theory while abusing power
vested in the judge, who fight for civil liberties around the world while ignoring
the rights of their own employees, who pass professional ethics exams with
flying colors only to engage in grossly unethical legal practices. Chief Justice
Warren Burger had some of these embodied virtues in mind when he urged that
"civility is to the courtroom and adversary process what antisepsis is to a hospi-
tal and operating room. The best medical brains cannot outwit soiled linen or
dirty scalpels - and the best legal skills cannot either justify or offset bad man-
ners." 224 The larger pragmatist point here is that we ought to move beyond the
purely discursive mode in which democratic deliberation is locked in discourse-
centered accounts and open the affective-behavioral channels through which
we communicate our attitudes in all their complexity and contradiction. The
research focus thereby shifts from discourse ethics to the "ethics of embodied
interaction," from verbal communication to "the word-body-action nexus,"
from textual interpretation to "pragmatist hermeneutics," and from the discur-
sive regime of democratic governance to "emotionally intelligent democ-
racy."' 225 This is the direction in which democratic theory has been moving in
recent years.
The discourse theoretic turn has influenced several legal practitioners in
this country who agree with Habermas and Rawls that "citizens owe one
another justifications for the laws they collectively enact ' 22' 6 but seek to expand
the deliberative process to make room for affect and emotions alongside princi-
ples and reasoned arguments. 22 7 According to pragmatism-conscious thinkers,
"democratic discourse theory needs to learn from dispute resolution theory, that
positions and parties may be multiple, that processes of deliberation may range
from principled argument to interest-based bargaining and coalition behavior,
to appeals based on emotions, faith and belief, as well as fact."'2 28 American
scholars working in this tradition call on participants in democratic discourse
"to renew their dedication to honesty, self-criticism, civility, good faith, and
224 Warren E. Burger, The Necessity for Civility, 52 F.R.D. 211, 215 (1971).
225 See Dmitri N. Shalin, Liberalism, Affect Control, and Emotionally Intelligent Democ-
racy, 4 J. HuM. RTS. 420-25 (2004); see also Shalin, supra note 177, at 254-75; see also
Dmitri Shalin, Discourse, Emotion, and Body Language of Democracy, paper presented at
the SSSI Stone Symposium (1999); Dmitri Shalin, Signing in the Flesh: Notes on Pragma-
tist Hermeneutics, a revised version of the paper presented at the annual meeting of the
Society for the Advancement of American Philosophy (2001). The impact that the emo-
tional heritage of the past has on building democracy in Russia is discussed in Dmitri N.
Shalin, Intellectual Culture, in RussiAN CULTURE AT THE CROSSROADS: PARADOXES OF
POSTCOMMUNIST CONSCIOUSNESS 41 (Dmitri N. Shalin ed., 1996).
226 Amy Gutmann & Dennis Thompson, Democratic Disagreement, in DELIBERATIVE
PoLITICS, supra note 141, at 243-44.
227 For a general overview, see two representative collections, DELIBERATIVE POLITICS,
supra note 141, and DELIBERATIVE DEMOCRACY (Jon Elster ed., 1988). An early example of
an attempt to move beyond Habermas can be found in AMY Gut ANI.4 & DENNIS THOWM-
SON, DEMOCRACY AND DISAGREEMENT (1996). See also Menkel-Meadow, supra note 15
(reviewing the pragmatism-influenced dispute resolution theory).
228 See Menkel-Meadow, supra note 15, at 359.
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respect for their opponents .... 229 In keeping with this agenda, they search
for:
a distinctively democratic kind of character - the character of individuals who are
morally committed, self-reflective about their commitments, discerning of the differ-
ence between respectable and merely tolerable differences of opinion, and open to
the possibility of changing their minds or modifying their positions at some time in
the future if they confront unanswerable objections to their present point of view.
2 3 0
Unlike their continental counterparts, however, scholars influenced by
American pragmatism recognize that legal professionals have to act as "mood
scientists, 231 that "sometimes [it is] necessary not only to 'promote mutual
respect . . .' but also to achieve authenticity, to reveal (as in 'testimony') the
pain and anger ... that someone actually feels, when expression or knowledge
of those feelings furthers the understanding that is the goal of deliberation. 2 32
Legal pragmatists follow John Dewy and George Herbert Mead, the two
preeminent pragmatist theorists of the fully embodied democratic process, who
advocated the "passing of functions which are supposed to inhere in govern-
ment into activities that belong to the community" and called for "the readjust-
ments of personal interests that have come into conflict and which take place
outside of court . . . [and] is not dependent upon an act of legislature. 233
Hence, the preference to work outside traditional legal venues where citizens
can assemble to resolve their disputes over proposed dump sites and highway
roads, parking garages and half-way houses, health issues and waste disposal,
inter-group and neighborhood conflicts, city-wide ordinances and national leg-
islations.234 Alongside citizens gathered in these venues toil legal professionals
who, according to Menkel-Meadow, have a role to play in local justification
discourses, for "lawyers may be particularly well suited to the design, manage-
ment and facilitation of consensus building processes, especially those which
implicate law, such as environmental, regulatory, governance, land-use, and
other 'legal' problems. 23 5 Lawyers are expected to do more than provide legal
expertise in the deliberation process. They have to model democracy in the
flesh, find a way to embody the virtues of reciprocity, mutual understanding,
and respectful disagreement where consensus turns out to be unachievable.
The process in such a deliberative practice is every bit as crucial as its outcome,
and often more so, for the consensus is bound to break down when we move to
229 Robert P. George, Democracy, and Moral Disagreement: Reciprocity, Slavery, and
Abortion, in DELIBERATIVE POLITICS, supra note 141, at 184, 194.
230 Amy Guttman & Dennis Thompson, Moral Conflict and Political Consensus, in WHY
DELIBERATIVE DEMOCRACY 64, 76 (1990).
231 See Clark Freshman et al., The Lawyer-Negotiator as Mood Scientist: What We Know
and Don't Know About How Mood Relates to Successful Negotiation, 2002 J. DIsP. RESOL.
1 (2002); see also Scott R. Peppet, Contract Formation in Imperfect Markets: Should We
Use Mediators in Deals?, 19 OHIo ST. J. ON DISP. RESOL. 283 (2004).
232 James Mansbridge, Everyday Talk in the Deliberative System, in DELIBERATIVE POLIT-
ics, supra note 223, at 211, 223.
233 George Herbert Mead, Natural Rights and the Theory of the Political Institution, in
SELECTED WRITINGS: GEORGE HERBERT MEAD 150, 166-67 (Andrew J. Reck ed., Phoenix
ed., Univ. Chicago Press 1981) (1964). See also Dmitri N. Shalin, G. H. Mead, Socialism,
and the Progressive Agenda, 92 AM. J. Soc. 913-951 (1988)
234 See Menkel-Meadow, supra note 15, at 363.
235 Id. at 367.
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implement the mediated agreement, but the goodwill the well-planned delibera-
tions engender may last beyond the fragile understanding reached on any given
occasion.
The mediation and settlement movement that takes its cue from pragma-
tism has many critics, including some legal pragmatists,23 6 who point out that
"[d]eliberation is not an activity for the demos; '2 37 that "the best thinking of
the best thinkers, deliberating under the best conditions, reflects nothing more
than the interests of the powers-that-be; '238 and that public deliberations "con-
front the problems of demagoguery, of sound-bite democracy, of the persistent
inability of facts and evidence to transcend background normative belief, and of
the extent to which the inequalities of society in general are reflected and repli-
cated in its deliberative environments. '239 There is merit to this critique, and
pragmatists should to take it seriously. They will also have to contend with the
old query that John Dewey addressed to legal professionals: "How are we to
explain the fact that to such a large extent the lawyers who have had a profes-
sional and supposedly a competent professional education seem to be the advo-
cates of the most reactionary political and social issues of the community at any
given time? ' 24 But then, half a century has passed since Dewey raised the
issue, and it is now fairly obvious that lawyers are not beholden to any given
political cause. Still, the challenges legal pragmatists face when they opt to
facilitate the fully embodied democratic process are great.
"In our own time," Justice William Brennan warned at the end of his illus-
trious career, "attention to experience may signal that the greatest threat to due
process principles is formal reason severed from the insights of passion."'21' To
reconnect reason with the rest of the body, to realize the ideal of embodied
reasonableness, legal professionals need to check their discursive stance against
the messages they are signing in the flesh, and when the gap grows wide, work
to realign mixed signals. Whether they toil at the bar, on the bench, or inside
mediation forums, jurists must hone their people skills and act as "strange
attractors" willing to remedy the laws' intractable contradictions with emotions
that are intelligent and intellect that is emotionally sane. Research on the place
of emotions in the legal process continues to emerge, and there is much that
legal scholars and social scientists can learn from each other in this area.
Architects of deliberative democracy are likely to be frustrated as long as
they continue to measure their success by the actually achieved consensus.
Nine Supreme Court Justices routinely fail to reach an agreement, delivering an
increasing number of split-decisions in recent years. Do we really think the rest
of us can do better? The law often appeals to reasonable persons' judgment,
yet one thing that stands out about reasonable people is that they agree to disa-
236 See POSNER, LAW, supra note 96, at 130-57.
237 Michael Walzer, Deliberation, and What Else?, in DELIBERATIVE POLITICS, supra note
141, at 58, 68.
238 Id. at 67.
239 Frederick Schauer, Talking as a Decision Procedure, in DELIBERATIVE POLITCS, supra
note 141, at 17, 23.
240 DEWEY, supra note 45, at 54.
241 William J. Brennan, An Eloquent Liberal Voice on Equal Rights and Privacy, N.Y.
TIMES, July 25, 1997, at B7.
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gree. It is heartening to see that deliberative democracy theorists shift their
emphasis away from rational consensus and move beyond "mere toleration"
toward "mutual respect (which is a more demanding form of agreeing to
disagree)."2 42
Integrating emotions and reasons into a coherent conceptual schema also
presents a problem. Menkel-Meadow divides modes of deliberation into prin-
ciple-based, bargain-oriented, and emotion-driven.2 43 However, this classifica-
tion creates an impression that principled discourses and interest-driven
negotiations are devoid of emotions while emotional conflicts or faith-based
disputes are devoid of principles. A robust yet flexible theoretical schema that
can accommodate logical, affective, and behavioral dimensions of deliberative
process may take time to articulate.
The biggest challenge facing legal pragmatists determined to insert them-
selves into the embodied democratic process is modeling its values in their
conduct. They have every right to do so. They need to remember Judge
Learned Hand's advice, however, "[l]iberty lies in the hearts of men and
women; when it dies there, no constitution, no law, no court can save it; no
constitution, no law, no court can even do much to help it."2" Democracy is
not held together by just laws, nor does it spring from wise constitutions. The
genius of the framers has less to do with the clever foundational documents
they cobbled together than with their embodied virtues, painfully limited
though these proved on occasion (why else would countries that copy our con-
stitution have such hard time bodying forth to its democratic ethos?). The
framers' chief strength was in their readiness to compromise, to accommodate
each other, and to go on searching for elusive answers in the face of the bitter
disagreements over principles. Therein lies the lesson for pragmatists, dis-
course theorists, social justice champions - all democracy boosters of our time.
No one holds a monopoly on democratic virtue. We should not assume
that pragmatists are more ethically gifted or deliberatively savvy than the pro-
ponents of other philosophical brands.24 5 Pragmatist hermeneutics will have to
tell us how to study the relationship between our discursive, affective, and
behavioral performances while dodging the dangers of ad hominem reasoning.
As the case of Immanuel Kant suggests, the misalignment between a theoretical
corpus, affective attitude, and behavioral performance is part of the human con-
dition. But the challenge is worth taking, and I hope that all those who under-
stand democracy as the fully embodied democratic process will not shrink from
it.
242 Gutmann & Thompson, supra note 226, at 251.
243 See Menkel-Meadow, supra note 15, at 365-66.
244 LEARNED HAND, THE SPIRIT OF LIBERTY: PAPERS AND ADDRESSES OF LEARNED HAND
190 (3d ptg. 1974).
245 An interesting example is the debate about Justice Cardozo's legal practice that accord-
ing to some feminist critics shows a gap between his publicly espoused principles and certain
legal decisions he rendered. See generally RICHARD A. POSNER, CARDOZO: A STUDY IN
REPUTATION 17 (1990) (quoting Catherine Weiss & Louis Melling, The Legal Education of
Twenty Women, 40 STAN. L. REV. 1299, 1350, 1350 n.128 (1988) (debating Justice Car-
dozo's legal practice in light of his holding that allegedly shows a gap between his publicly
espoused principles and certain legal decisions he rendered)); but see POSNER, supra, at 47-




Over two millennia ago Aristotle observed that "all things are not deter-
mined by law, ... that about some things it is impossible to lay down a law,"
and that we must undertake "a correction of law where it is defective owing to
its universality. 24 6 Pragmatists have been expounding on this premise for just
over a century, providing legal scholars with ammunition in their polemics
against legal formalism. Although there is no consensus about legal pragma-
tism's tenets, jurists identifying with this movement tend to be skeptical about
immutable principles, mindful of their historical meaning, sympathetic to judi-
cial discretion, attentive to legal outcomes' likely consequences, and open to
social science findings that promise to illuminate the relationship between law
and society.
As I tried to make clear in this essay, legal pragmatists cannot dispense
with principles altogether. The theoretical nihilism Stanley Fish urges us to
follow as a shortcut to justice is no more viable than the principled textualism
Justice Scalia proposes as a solution to the reigning judicial chaos. Legal con-
sequences do not come to us with price tags attached, ready to be sorted out as
pragmatically sound or pragmatically spurious ones. Someone has to judge the
consequences, figure out their cost, and such an evaluation requires a contesta-
ble standard. By the same token, pragmatist jurisprudence rejects the notion
that laws are to be interpreted by some immutable principles lodged in a time-
less legal canon. The rule of law does not dispense with women and men who
lend it its time-bound agentic substance. Laws do not interpret themselves;
they are applied by fallible human beings who need room for honest differences
of opinion. As Justice Breyer pointed out, we should strive to do justice to the
competing constitutional principles as well as to the historical consequences of
specific legal holdings.
I have also tried to articulate another strain in legal pragmatism, the one
that casts our political system as an embodied phenomenon. Democracy is
more than a discourse. It is also a civic culture "which encourages trust, toler-
ance, prudence, compassion, humor, and withers away when overexposed to
suspicion, hatred, vanity, cruelty, and sarcasm."2"7 This pragmatist perspective
on democracy bids us to look for its somatic-affective, behavioral-performa-
tive, as well as ethical-discursive equivalents. One can only get that far
redeeming reasons with reasons, words with more words. "[T]he life according
to virtue lived without impediment, '2 4 8 which the author of the Nicomachean
Ethics took for the highest ideal, requires that we redeem our discursive claims
with emotionally intelligent attitudes, affective offerings with bold behavioral
commitments, and behavioral performances with principled arguments, as we
travel the full hermeneutical circle where embodied meaning acquires its con-
crete historical shape. To achieve its pragmatic end, an ideal speech situation
246 Aristotle, Nicomachean Ethics, in THE BASIC WORKS OF ARISTOTLE 935, 1020 (Richard
McKeon ed., 28th prtg. 1941).
247 Mission Statement of The UNLV Center for Democratic Culture, at http:/!
www.unlv.edu /centers/cdclv/mission/index.html (last visited Jan. 21, 2005).
248 Aristotle, Politica, in THE BASIC WORKS OF ARISTOTLE, supra note 246, at 1127, 1220.
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must include logos, pathos, and ethos, leaving ample room not only for intellec-
tual prowess but also for emotional creativity and moral imagination.
Once again, we find a precursor for this line of reasoning in Aristotle.
This proto-pragmatist taught us that "each government has a peculiar character
which originally formed and which continue to preserve it. The character of
democracy creates democracy, and the character of oligarchy creates oligarchy;
and always the better the character the better the government."249 We might
want to reexamine the legal process in line with this premise, and that means
recasting democratic justice as both a discursive and nondiscursive practice in
the course of which legal professionals shape - or misshape - the social order
they are sworn to protect. Jurists are engaged in a continuous production of
social reality as objective and meaningful. They play a special role in this
process as guardians of cherished terminologies waiting to be applied to con-
tested situations whose indeterminacy jurists terminate not only discursively
but also somatically, affectively, and behaviorally. The promise of legal prag-
matism will not be fulfilled until its proponents grasp democratic justice as an
embodied process.
249 Id. at 1305.
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